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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)0). 
Introduction 
In 2008, this Court issued Conatser v. Johnson, in which it held that "the 
public has the right to touch privately owned beds of state waters in ways 
incidental to" their recreational activities on those waters. 2008 UT 48, ,r 30, 194 
P.3d 897. The Utah State Legislature responded to Conatser by enacting the Public 
Waters Access Act (the" Act"), which is now codified at Utah Code sections 73-
29-101 through-208. That Act scales back the scope of access to streambeds over 
which public waters flow, declaring that" [t]he public may use a public water for 
recreational activity" only where the public water (1) "is a navigable water," (2) 
"is on public property," or (3) is "on private property ... with the private 
property owner's permission." Utah Code § 73-29-201(1), (2). 
The Utah Stream Access Coalition ("USAC"), frustrated by the Act's 
restriction on access to privately owned streambeds, seeks judicial assistance in 
gaining access to the waters its members wish to fish and float-specifically, a 
one-mile stretch of the Weber River near Peoa, Utah. (Tr.Ex. 1; attached as Add. 
A.) USAC has asked for a declaratory judgment that the one-mile stretch is 
navigable, and because it is navigable, the State holds title to its streambed, 
which makes the bed public property. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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But USAC has gone too far. It seeks a declaratory judgment that the State 
has title to a streambed that the State does not want, and to which USAC claims 
no legal interest. Moreover, the Act does not provide a mechanism whereby 
members of the public may quiet title to property on behalf of the State. USAC 
therefore lacks standing to challenge the existing landowners' title, and the 
district court erred in declaring the State to hold title to the bed of this stretch of 
the Weber River. 
USAC otherwise claims that it is entitled to access the one-mile stretch of 
the Weber River because the river is navigable. This claim is governed by the 
Act, and it follows that the definition of a "navigable water" in the Act should 
apply to the determination of navigability USAC seeks. But the parties did not 
present the Act's definition of navigability to the district court. And while the 
district court did recognize that USAC' s right to access public waters flows from 
the Act, it also failed to apply the Act's definition. It was therefore plain error for 
the court to apply a different definition of navigability. 
Rather than applying the Act's definition of navigability, the district court 
applied the federal test for navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine. 
This test required the court to evaluate statehood-era evidence of trade and 
travel on the one-mile stretch of the Weber River. That evidence was limited to 
intermittent log drives that occurred during spring runoff. But under the federal 
test, log drives are not enough; evidence of boat travel is also required. In 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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addition, under the federal test, evidence of the requisite trade and travel on a 
specific waterway must be more than trade and travel during times of temporary 
high water. The evidence here was of use only during such periods. The district 
court therefore erred by misinterpreting and misapplying the federal test for 
navigability. 
Orange Street Development respectfully asks this court to reverse the 
district court's judgment declaring that the one-mile stretch of the Weber River is 
navigable and finding the State holds title to that streambed. 
Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Did the district court err in declaring that "the State of Utah holds 
sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber" River where it crosses the 
landowners' properties and in issuing a judgment in favor of USAC to this effect 
where USAC lacked standing to request this relief? 
Standard of Review: Standing is "generally a question of law," reviewed 
by this court for correctness. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, ,r 7, 
201 P.3d 1004. 
Preservation: "[S]tanding is a jurisdictional requirement" and "can be 
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal." Brown v. Div. of Water 
Rights of the Dep't of Natural Res., 2010 UT 14, ,r 13,228 P.3d 747. The State raised 
the issue of USAC' s standing to litigate the question of title to the riverbed at 
R.861. 
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Issue 2: Did the district court err when it failed to apply Utah's Public 
Waters Access Act's definition of "navigable water" to the question of whether 
the Act permits USAC to use the Weber River for recreational activity where it 
crosses the landowners' properties? 
Standard of Review: When a party fails to preserve an issue below, this 
court reviews that issue "under the manifest injustice or plain error standard." 
State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ,r 11, 154 P.3d 788. 
Preservation: This issue is not preserved. 
Issue 3: Did the district court err when it concluded under the federal test 
of navigability for title that the Weber River is navigable where it crosses the 
landowners' properties based solely on evidence of statehood-era log floats 
where controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent indicates evidence of 
statehood-era boat travel is also required? 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's conclusions of 
law de novo. In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35, ,r 41,308 P.3d 382. 
Preservation: Orange Street preserved this issue at R.733, 740, 745-54 and 
978:36-39. 
Issue 4: Did the district court err when it concluded under the federal test 
of navigability for title that the Weber River is navigable where it crosses the 
landowners' properties based solely on log drives that occurred during spring 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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runoff where controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent requires that a river's 
utility for trade and travel not be limited to times of temporary high water? 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's conclusions of 
law de novo. In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 UT 35, il 41, 308 P.3d 382. 
Preservation: Orange Street preserved this issue at R.752-54. 
Determinative Provisions 
Two provisions of the Public Waters Access Act, Utah Code sections 73-29-
102 and 73-29-201, are determinative and are attached as Addendum B. 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
On May 5, 2011, the Utah Stream Access Coalition ("USAC"), filed a 
complaint against Orange Street Development (" Orange Street"), James Park, 
Wendell and Ila Stembridge, and Vern and Dorothy Stembridge (collectively, the 
"landowners")- all of whom own property located along a one-mile stretch of 
the Weber River. USAC also sued the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
vJ ("DWR"), the Utah Division of Parks and Recreation ("DPR"), and the sheriff of 
Summit County. (R.1-3.) USAC alleged that the Weber River, where it passes 
through the landowners' properties, was navigable at the time of Utah's 
statehood, that the State of Utah holds title to the streambed and that, as a result, 
the public has the right to enter and use the streambed. (R.4-5.) USAC alleged 
that the landowners have prevented members of USAC from entering and using 
5 
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the streambed, and that DWR, DPR, and the sheriff have used-or threatened to 
use-their legal authority to cite for criminal trespass members of the public who 
access and use the streambed of the river where it crosses the landowners' 
properties without the landowners' permission. (R.5-6.) USAC sought relief in 
the form of a declaratory judgment that under the Act the public has the right to 
access and use the river and streambed where it crosses the landowners' 
properties. (R.8-9,560.) USAC also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions 
enjoining the defendants from interfering with public access to the river and 
streambed. (R.8-10.) 
Defendants each answered the complaint. (R.53-60,61-67,68-74,75-82,83-
87.) Thereafter, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of DWR, DPR, and the 
sheriff from the action, substituting the Utah Division of Forestry, Fire, and State 
Lands (the "State"). (R.123-24.) The parties also stipulated that Park and the 
Stembridge parties would not participate in the litigation in any way, but would 
be bound by the district court's rulings. (R.526-28,768-70.) Thus, only USAC, 
Orange Street, and the State participated in the litigation and presented evidence 
and argument at trial. The State viewed its role in the litigation as advisory and 
took "no formal position" as to whether the one-mile stretch of the Weber River 
was navigable, but ultimately expressed doubt as to "whether the Weber meets 
the applicable test" for navigability. (R.674;676;974:29-31;978:53-54.) 
6 
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Prior to trial, the parties sought to clarify the scope of USAC' s requested 
relief. They filed a stipulation with the court acknowledging that the court's 
ruling would apply only to the stretch of the Weber River where it crosses the 
landowners' properties, and would not affect other properties upstream or 
downstream. (R.237-41.) The State also filed a motion to limit the scope of the 
court's findings and conclusions, alternatively labeling it a motion to dismiss. 
(R.242-44,248-320.) This motion addressed the State's concern that the court's 
decision would "affect the interest of hundreds of riverfront landowners along 
the Weber River not named in this action." (R.253.) USAC opposed the State's 
motion, and in doing so stated as follows: 
The Coalition is not seeking to quiet title to the streambed. It seeks a 
right of access and use only. Depending on the ultimate 
determination of navigability in this case, the State may in the future 
decide to bring quiet title actions against the Landowner Defendants 
and other riparian landowners; however, neither the Coalition nor 
the State is attempting to assert such claims here. 
(R.337.) 
The State ultimately withdrew its motion, and USAC and the State filed a 
second stipulation regarding the scope of USAC's requested relief. (R.498-502.) 
USAC and the State agreed that the court could make findings regarding 
activities that occurred along the "[b]roader [r]each" of the Weber River, but that 
"title-implicating findings and conclusions should be limited" to the stretch of 
river where it crosses the landowners' properties. (R.499-500.) 
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The parties each filed a trial brief. (R.557-82,643-77,731-55.) In USAC's trial 
brief it explained-for the first time-that it sought access to the riverbed 
pursuant to the Public Waters Access Act, Utah Code sections 73-29-201 through 
-208. (R.560.) 
The district court held a four-day bench trial in February 2015, followed by 
one day of closing arguments in March 2015. (R.765-67,771-78,850,974-78.) The 
court issued its Legal Analysis, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
April 10, 2015. (R.867-92; attached as Add. C.) The district court found in favor of 
USAC and issued a declaratory judgment that the Weber River "where it passes 
by and through the Landowner Properties" was navigable at the time of 
statehood and that USAC's "members and the general public are entitled to use 
the riverbed of the Weber River at [that location] for lawful recreational 
purposes," citing Utah Code section 73-29-201(1). (R.892.) In addition, the court 
declared that "the State of Utah holds sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber 
below the ordinary high water mark at the location of the Landowner 
Properties." (R.892.) The court issued an injunction preventing the landowners 
from interfering with the public's right to access the streambed. (R.892.) 
The district court issued its final judgment on May 19, 2015. (R.948-51; 
attached as Add. D.) Orange Street timely appealed. (R.952-54.) 
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2. Statement of the Facts 
The parties agreed that the central issue in this case was whether the one-
mile stretch of the Weber River was navigable on January 4, 1896, the date Utah 
entered the Union. (R.647,732,868.) The district court was therefore tasked with 
deciding how to determine whether the one-mile stretch of the Weber River was 
navigable at statehood, and whether the evidence presented by USAC at trial 
was sufficient to prove that the Weber River was navigable at that time.1 
(R.868,872.) 
2.1 The parties presented the district court with different 
interpretations of the rule for determining navigability 
The parties agreed that the basic formulation of the test to be used by the 
district court to determine navigability was articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1870: "Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable 
rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when 
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as 
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in 
~ the customary modes of trade and travel on water." (R.561,648,739); 17re Daniel 
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870). And the parties agreed that the 
navigability determination should be made based on the .,.,natural and ordinary" 
condition of the river at statehood. (R.561-62,649,741,745-46.) 
1 USAC and Orange Street agreed that USAC bore the burden of proving 
navigability by a preponderance of the evidence. (R.738;974:14;978:41-42.) 
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But the parties' agreement regarding the navigability rule ended there. 
They disagreed as to the nuances of the navigability test, and two issues in 
particular: (1) whether the test requires a showing of both trade and travel- in 
other words, whether log drives alone are sufficient to establish navigability-
and (2) whether log drives that occur during seasonal runoff are evidence of 
navigability. 
USAC argued that log drives, alone, are sufficient to establish navigability. 
(R.567.) It claimed that the navigability inquiry has 11no requirement of transport 
by particular vessels, or of transport for hire, either of passengers or goods." 
(R.567.) USAC argued that "[t]rade and travel is not a phrase that limits the 
mode of transport. It just means you have to have movement from one place to 
another up or down the river, it just reinforces the highway concept." (R.978:17-
18.) USAC also argued that because courts have never said log drives alone are 
not enough to support a navigability finding, boat travel is not necessarily an 
element of the navigability test. (R.974:17-18.) 
Orange Street, on the other hand, argued that the United States Supreme 
Court has never held that log drives, alone, are sufficient to establish navigability 
for title purposes. (R.733,740.) And log drives alone are insufficient because the 
Court's focus in navigability for title cases is actual navigation. (R.740-42.) Orange 
Street explained that the test for navigability "has always required evidence of 
both trade and travel," and that to demonstrate travel, there must be evidence of 
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navigability by boats of the kind used at statehood. (R.745-49.) It argued that 
"trade and travel mean[] two different things," where trade is "the movement of 
goods up and down the river," which can be established by evidence of log 
drives, but travel "is the movement of things by boat, perhaps barges" and 
cannot be established by evidence of log drives. (R. 978:36-38.) 
The State agreed with Orange Street that the test for navigability requires 
that both trade and travel be possible. (R.649,861-62.) And while recognizing that 
evidence of log drives is probative of navigability, the State agreed that "[t]he 
majority of cases ... rely upon susceptibility to some kind of boat travel as an 
indicium of navigability." (R.650-52.) The State urged the court to "treat[] boat 
travel as an important indicator within the navigability analysis." (R.863.) 
As to the issue of whether log drives that occurred during seasonal runoff 
are sufficient to establish whether a river was used for "trade and travel," USAC 
argued that "the seasonal or sporadic nature of the log drives on the Weber and 
other Western rivers does not detract from their navigability." (R.568.) This is so, 
USAC suggested, because seasonal log drives were still regular and dependable 
enough to allow a river to be "a highway of useful commerce." (R.568-69;974:19-
20;978:19-20 (quotations and emphasis omitted).) 
In contrast, Orange Street argued that seasonal log drives cannot constitute 
evidence of navigability because those drives are only ✓, occasional" and occur "in 
times of high water." (R.754.) Orange Street also argued that log drives that occur 
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"only in seven or eight percent of the year" do not necessarily represent waters 
in their "natural and ordinary condition." (R.978:49.) 
The State identified the issue of whether a river is navigable where log 
drives are "limited to temporary times of high water" as possibly "[t]he most 
important legal question in this case." (R.656,863-64 (quotations omitted).) It 
recognized that "courts accept that navigable conditions need not prevail the 
entire year, but nevertheless require that they not be confined to temporary times 
of high water." (R.658.) The State described this rule as a "practical limitation" 
that" draws a line that excludes streams that are too small to be realistically 
useful except in times of high water." (R.863.) 
2.2 The parties presented evidence at trial regarding the navigability 
of the Weber River 
At trial, USAC called three witnesses to testify. First, Kristofor Olson, the 
president of USAC, testified that prior to 2010 he and other members of the 
public utilized the Weber River where it crosses the landowners' properties for 
fishing. (R. 97 4:42.) Olson and others would access the river from Brown's 
Canyon Bridge or by crossing private property with the permission of a 
landowner. (R.974:42.) He stopped fishing this stretch of the Weber in 2010 when 
"[s]tate law changed" and "[n]o trespassing signs specific to the use of the river 
bed went up right at Brown's Canyon Bridge." (R.974:43.) Olson explained that 
USAC filed this lawsuit in order to "allow us the type of access and ... use that 
we had before" 2010. (R.974:43.) 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
USAC' s second witness was its expert, Sara Dant, a professor of history at 
Weber State University. (R.974:46.) Dant testified in great detail regarding 
statehood-era evidence of commercial use of the upper Weber River, including 
the portion of the river that crosses the landowners' properties, and specifically 
about log drives that were conducted on the upper Weber River and the 
economic importance of those drives to the region's development and economy. 
(R. 97 4:84-249;975:6-97.) 
Based on the evidence she examined, Dant testified that she was 
"completely confident" that railroad tie drives occurred on the upper Weber in 
1877 and 1879. (R.974:128-29;Tr.Ex.64.) She testified that it was "reasonable to 
conclude" that there were drives in 1880, 1881, and 1882, and that it was 
"reasonable to suspect" that there was a drive in 1883. 
(R.974:138,143,148,lS0;Tr.Ex.64.) And she testified "with reservation" that there 
was another tie drive in 1896. (R.974:153-54;Tr.Ex.64.) Dant also suggested that it 
"was likely" that there were other drives during this time. (R.974:157;Tr.Ex.64.) 
As to the driving of mining timbers, cordwood, and saw logs, Dant 
testified about a timber drive that was attempted-but failed due to low water-
in 1888, partially successful in 1889 (another low water year), and completed in 
1890. (R.974:173-77,194-95,232;Tr.Ex.64.) Dant testified regarding "indications" 
that other timber or cordwood drives were conducted in 1891 and 1892. 
(R.974:197-99.) Dant also discussed the sawmills that were located along the 
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Weber River and explained that logs were floated to the sawmills, but milled 
lumber was probably hauled overland to its final destination rather than put 
back into the river. (R.974:198-203;975:78-85,88-89.) 
Dant tes~ied that II most" of these drives would have passed through the 
landowners' properties. (R.974:231.) She explained that 11 [m]any of the accounts 
we have suggest that the bulk of the timber is coming from the East Weber, the 
headwaters area and it's being floated first to Echo and later to Wanship and in 
order for that to happen, it would have had to have passed through what is now 
property of the defendants." (R.974:231.) Dant also testified that the log drives 
occurred during spring runoff (R.974:107-09,137-38,170,208,229.) She also 
explained that she found no evidence of II alterations to the natural stream 
channel or flow to assist the log drives," and no evidence of splash or wing dams 
on the Weber River. (R.974:212-213;975:74-75.) And Dant testified that other log 
drives-similar to those that occurred on the Weber-took place on the Provo, 
Bear, and Blacks Fork Rivers during the same period of time. (R.974:236-
41;975:75.) 
Finally, Dant testified that she found no evidence of commercial boat 
travel on the Weber River where it crosses the landowners' properties during the 
statehood era. (R.975:76.) 
USAC' s final witness, Gary Nichols- a kayaker, canoer, licensed river 
guide, and author of a book on river running in Utah- offered expert testimony 
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regarding the present-day characteristics of the Weber River from Holiday Park 
to Wanship, and from Wanship to Echo. (R.975:98-101;115-17.) As to the Holiday 
Park to Wanship segment, Nichols testified that it is "seasonally floatable today, 
by small river watercraft." (R.975:128.) He explained that this segment is not 
boatable year round, but can be floated "sometimes as early as late April, but the 
latter part of May through June and sometimes early July[] are the main times." 
(R.975:121.) As to the segment from Wanship to Echo, Nichols testified that this 
segment is boatable during the irrigation season, which is usually more than two 
months in length, and is "very capable" of floating with a kayak, canoe, or raft. 
(R.975:132-33,135-36.) Nichols also testified that he has seen logs floating in the 
river, including logs the size of railroad ties. (R.975:107,110-12,128-29,136-37,173-
74,193-95.) 
Orange Street likewise called three witnesses at trial. Its first witness, 
David Dassing-a kayaker, river runner, and former river guide who resides in 
Peoa, Utah- testified that the upper Weber River can be run during only a few 
weeks each year, or for "a couple of weeks as it ramps up and then a couple 
weeks as it ramps down" during the spring runoff. (R.975:199-201,206-207.) 
Next, Stewart Grow, the general partner of Orange Street, testified that 
Orange Street owns approximately fifteen acres in Peoa, Utah, on Browns 
Canyon Road, and that the Weber River bisects that property. (R.976:4-6.) Grow, 
himself, also owns eleven acres directly downstream from the Orange Street 
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property. (R.976:5-6.) Grow testified that approximately two of the total twenty-
six acres is covered by the bed of the Weber River. (R.976:12.) Grow and Orange 
Street purchased their acreage in 1993, including the riverbed, and Grow has 
paid property taxes on the twenty-six acres-including the two acres of 
riverbed-since that time. (R.976:11-13.) Grow testified that he placed "no 
trespassing'' signs on the property ten to fifteen years ago. (R.976:7-8.) 
Grow testified regarding the condition of the Weber River where it crosses 
Orange Street's property. (R.976:16-18.) And he testified regarding points at 
which the public can access the Weber River in the vicinity of Orange Street's 
property. (R.976:26-28.) Grow testified that approximately twelve times a year 
fishermen will come to his property and ask if they can fish. (R.976:28.) On all but 
one occasion, he allowed the fishermen to access and use the Weber River where 
it crosses his property. (R.976:28-29.) 
Orange Street's final witness was its expert, Thomas Alexander, an 
emeritus professor of history from Brigham Young University. (R.976:42.) 
Alexander reviewed and evaluated Dant' s report and the evidence Dant used in 
preparing her report. (R.976:46-47.) Although he characterized Dant's work as "a 
careful report," he did not agree with many of her conclusions regarding log 
drives on the Weber River. (R.976:49,53;Tr.Ex.85.) He agreed log drives occurred 
in 1880 and 1881, as well as 1890, but disagreed that the evidence was sufficient 
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to conclude that log drives took place in any other year.2 (R.976:55,74-91,114-
26,190-92;Tr.Ex.85.) He also suggested that the evidence shows that the 
riverbanks had to be improved in order to accommodate log drives, specifically 
by building up the banks of the river and with wing dams. (R.976:71-72,106.) 
Alexander also testified that there was no evidence of travel or the 
transport of people up or down the Weber River where it crosses the 
landowners' properties at the time of statehood. (R.976:104.) And Alexander 
opined that Dant' s research and evidence regarding log drives on rivers other 
than the Weber, are "not particularly relevant" to this case. (R.976:108.) 
Alexander also testified about the various sawmills located along the upper 
Weber River in the statehood era. (R.976:98-103,174-86.) 
The State called two expert witnesses. First, Jedediah Rogers, senior state 
historian for the Utah Division of State History, testified regarding his review of 
Dant's sources and report and Alexander's report. (R.976:205,209.) Rogers agreed 
with Dant that there was "conclusive evidence" of a log drive on the upper 
Weber River in 1877, and "a possible or likely" drive in 1879. (R.976:211-15.) He 
identified II direct evidence of a drive in 1880," another drive in 1881, and a 
"likely" drive in 1882. (R.976:216-21;977:55-56.) In contrast to Dant, Rogers could 
not conclude that a log drive took place in 1883, explaining that he found II only 
evidence that a ... drive was expected or wanted in '83." (R.976:221.) Rogers 
2 Alexander did not review or consider evidence of pre-1880 log drive activity on 
the upper Weber River. (R.976:55,lll;Tr.Ex.85.) 
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determined that a drive was attempted in 1888, but the timber became 
"stranded" because of low water somewhere above the landowners' properties. 
(R.976:222-28;977:4-6,68-72.) According to Rogers, that timber "may have" been 
driven down the river in 1889, but "a full-length drive from the upper reaches of 
the Weber down to Wanship likely did not happen." (R.977:6,72.) Rogers testified 
that the drive did occur in 1890. (R.977:6,72-73.) 
Rogers testified that a log drive occurred in 1892 on the upper Weber, but 
it did not pass through the landowners' properties. (R.977:7-8.) Finally, Rogers 
cited "inconclusive evidence of a drive in [18]96." (R.977:8-9,75-78.) Rogers 
testified that he found no evidence of any type of log drive after that year. 
(R.977:9.) 
Rogers also testified that the "sources are consistent" that the log drives on 
the upper Weber occurred "during the spring runoff," but the sources do not 
discuss the duration of the log drives. (R.977:35-36.) And Rogers testified that the 
"window of time ... for sufficient driving flows" did not "materialize every year 
on the Weber River" during the statehood era. (R.977:38.) 
Rogers, too, testified about sawmills on the upper Weber River. (R.977:13-
35,81-83,88-102.) Roger also discussed Dant' s evaluation of log drives on the 
Provo, Bear, and Black's Fork Rivers, stating that those drives do not "tell• us 
anythlng directly about the Weber River, whether it saw log drives or ... 
whether the Weber River was driveable or susceptible to be driven." (R. 977:41-
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42.) And, finally, Rogers testified that he found no evidence of boating on the 
upper Weber River during the time in question. (R.977:52-53.) 
The State's second expert witness, Candice Hasenyager, an engineer with 
the Utah Division of Water Resources, testified regarding the dynamics and 
"floatability" of the Weber River. (R.977:124-25.) Among other things, 
Hasenyager discussed the Oakley gauge, which began recording flow data on 
the Weber River in Oakley in 1904, and has run continuously since then. 
(R.977:136.) She testified that the data from the Oakley gauge show variability in 
flow of the river from year to year, and variability in the week in which the flow 
peaks. (R.977:140-41.) Hasenyager also testified that the flow of the Weber River 
measured at the Oakley gauge is "usually less" than the flow of the Green, 
Duchesne, White, San Juan, and Bear Rivers. (R.977:158-60.) And Hasenyager 
testified regarding factors, such as spring runoff and snow pack, that affect the 
mean annual flow of a river. (R.977:181-82.) 
2.3 The district court's findings off act and conclusions of law 
On April 10, 2015, the district court entered its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. (R.867-92.) The district court identified the issue in this case 
as "whether members of the public may use for recreation - including fishing -
the riverbed on the I one-mile stretch' of the Weber River adjacent to the 
Landowners Defendants' properties," and explained that this question required 
the court to determine whether the one-mile stretch was navigable at statehood. 
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(R.868.) If it was, then under Utah Code section 73-29-201(1), "the riverbed is 
state sovereign land and members of the public have the right under state law to 
use it for recreation." (R.868.) In a footnote, the court explained that the Public 
Waters Access Act overruled Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48, 194 P.3d 897, and 
that Conatser "held that the public has a right to use the beds of all waters in the 
state." (R.868.) The court added, "[a]s state law stands today, Utahans are 
allowed to use the beds of rivers where they cross private lands only if the rivers 
are navigable for title purposes under federal law." (R.868.) 
The court first explained the analytical model by which it determined 
whether the one-mile stretch of the Weber River was navigable at statehood. 
(R.868-72.) Next, it detailed its findings of fact. (R.872-88.) And finally, it applied 
its analytical model to the facts, and reached the conclusion that the Weber River 
where it crosses the landowners' properties was navigable at statehood. (R.888-
92.) 
Addressing the standard for navigability, the district court explained that 
it would apply the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball: 
mRivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being 
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade 
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel 
on water."' (R.869 (quoting 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870).) The district court 
also explained that navigability must be fixed as of the time of statehood, and 
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that the navigability determination is 11based on the natural and ordinary 
condition of the water." (R.869 (quotations omitted).) 
As to the type of evidence needed to demonstrate navigability, the district 
court said 11 [d]eterntining navigability is not limited to considering whether ships 
or boats can pass through the Weber River at the one-mile stretch." (R.870.) 
Rather, it explained that other courts 11have ruled that log drives are a basis for 
establishing navigability in a title case," though it acknowledged that the most 
recent navigability for title case from the United States Supreme Court II did not 
discuss the issue of log drives." (R.870-71.) But the district court observed that 
the U.S. Supreme Court II did not rule out the potential for finding navigability 
based upon log drive evidence." (R.871.) 
The district court also discussed the "seasonality of log drives or other 
navigational uses" and its relevance to a navigability determination: 11The fact 
that, during certain seasons of a year, a waterway may not be useful for 
commerce or trade should not bar a finding of navigability ... provided that the 
waterway was regularly used for commerce on a seasonal basis, and was not 
dependent on unusual conditions for use in commerce." (R.871.) The court stated 
that "[e]vidence of regular seasonal commerce can satisfy the Daniel 
Ball/ navigability-for-title test." (R.872.) 
Proceeding to its findings of fact, the court first discussed flows on the 
upper Weber River, or the section of the river from its headwaters near Holiday 
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Park to Echo. (R.875.) It recited flow data from the Oakley gauge and observed 
that "the bulk of the Weber's flow comes in the spring runoff season, typically 
during the months of May and June." (R.876.) It found that "present-day flows 
on the Upper Weber above[] Oakley are not materially different than they were 
at statehood." (R.877.) Additionally, the court explained that it found "the expert 
testimony of ... Nichols to be persuasive on the present-day conditions and 
characteristics of the Upper Weber and the flows at which it is capable of floating 
small recreational boats and cut logs 8-10 ft. long during normal spring flows," 
concluding on the basis of that testimony that "the Upper Weber can easily float 
small recreational boats and cut logs 8-10 ft. in length at flows above 500 cfs." 
(R.877-78.) And the court found that "general conditions and characteristics on 
the Upper Weber during the statehood era or in 1896 were not materially 
different than present-day conditions and characteristics." (R.878.) 
Next, the court addressed log drives on the upper Weber River, explaining 
that it found Dant's testimony persuasive. (R.879.) The district court observed 
that "[r ]iver drives were a critical component of the railroad and railroad tie 
industries," and that "[r]ivers that connected the timber forests in the mountains 
with a railroad line were chosen for these drives." (R.879.) Specifically, "[i]n 1869, 
the Union Pacific extended the Transcontinental Railroad to Echo, Utah, and 
established a connection between the railroad and the Upper Weber River." 
(R.880.) Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the court 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
concluded that tie drives occurred on the Weber River in 1877, 1879, 1880, 1881, 
and 1882. (R.881-82,889.) It also concluded that there is a "strong possibility" that 
a tie drive also occurred in 1883 and that "it is more probable than not" that a 
drive took place in 1896. (R.882-83,889.) And the court explained that "[i]t is 
likely that other tie drives occurred on the Upper Weber during the 1870s 
through the 1890s that would have passed through the Landowner Properties, 
although exact dates and circumstances are not specifically documented in the 
historical record." (R.883.) 
The court also noted that tie drives are documented on the upper Bear 
River, the Blacks Fork River, and the Provo River in "spring runoff conditions" 
during the statehood era. (R.884.) The court observed that these rivers "are 
similar in size and flow to the Upper Weber, and have similar characteristics in 
terms of seasonal runoff, bed composition, some braiding, continuous steep 
gradients, Class 1-3 rapids and no permanent obstacles to navigation by small 
recreational boats or cut logs during normal spring flows," and that "these 
similarities also existed in the statehood era." (R.884.) 
Next, the court discussed the driving of mining timbers and cordwood on 
the upper Weber River. (R.885.) It found that a drive was begun in 1888, but that 
it was "tied up" due to "low water." (R.885.) The drive resumed in 1889, and the 
court found that the logs "passed through the Landowner Properties either in 
1888 or in 1889, depending on where in Peoa they were hung up," and the drive 
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was ultimately completed in 1890. (R.885-86,889.) As with railroad ties, the court 
found that "[i]t is likely that other drives of mining timber and cordwood 
occurred on the Upper Weber that would have passed through the Landowner 
Properties during the 1880s and 90s, although exact dates and circumstances of 
the drives are not specifically documented in the historical record." (R.886-87.) 
Finally, the court found that ''[i]n the 1880s and 1890s, logs were floated 
down the Weber River from the upper Weber canyon to various sawmills located 
along the river to be processed into lumber." (R.887.) Moreover, the court found 
that some of these logs would have passed through the landowners' properties. 
(R.887-88.) 
Applying these facts to the navigability analysis, the court concluded that 
the upper Weber was used as an actual "highway of commerce" for railroad ties 
during the late 1870s through 1896, and that "[i]t is likely that most of this 
commerce passed through the Landowner Properties." (R.888.) Likewise, during 
the 1880s and 1890s, the river was used as a "highway of commerce" for mining 
timbers and cordwood, and "[i]t is likely that a large portion of this commerce 
passed through the Landowner Properties." (R.888.) And during the same 
period, the river served as a "highway of commerce" for transporting logs to 
sawmills along the river, and "[s]ome of this commerce passed through the 
Landowner Properties." (R.888.) 
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The court explained that '' there is no evidence suggesting that absence of 
documented drives on the Upper Weber during other years leading up to 
statehood was due to unfavorable river conditions," except during the drive that 
occurred from 1888 to 1889. (R.889.) Thus, the court found that "the Upper 
Weber was susceptible of being used for log and tie drives under normal 
conditions throughout the statehood era, including in 1896." (R.889-90.) The 
court also noted that the documented drives on other Utah rivers during the 
same time period confirm that finding. (R.890.) 
The court found that the log drives were "conducted in the customary 
modes of trade and travel over water," "occurred on the Upper Weber in its 
natural condition," and were "usefully and dependably performed during 
ordinary spring runoff conditions." (R.890-91.) The court also found that the log 
drives constituted "useful commerce." (R.891.) Finally, the court explained, 
"[w]here it passes by and through the Landowner Properties, the Weber River 
was, at the time of statehood, used and susceptible of being used, in its natural 
and ordinary condition, as [a] highway of commerce, over which trade and travel 
were conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over water. Thus, it 
is navigable in fact." (R.891.) 
Because it found the upper Weber River where it passes through the 
landowners' properties to be navigable in fact, the court concluded that it was 
navigable in law, and because it is navigable in law, "the State of Utah holds 
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sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber below the ordinary high water mark 
at the location of the Landowner Properties." (R.892.) As a result, under Utah 
Code section 73-29-201(1), members of USAC and the public "are entitled to use 
the riverbed of the Weber River ... for lawful recreational purposes." (R.892.) 
On May 19, 2015, the district court entered a final judgment consistent 
with these findings and conclusions. (R.948-51.) The court ordered Orange Street 
and the other landowners "to remove any no trespassing signs from their 
properties that ... are inconsistent with the public's rights" to use and access the 
river, "and to take no further actions interfering with such public rights." (R.950.) 
Summary of the Argument 
USAC lacks standing to challenge title to the bed of the Weber River where 
it crosses the landowners' properties. USAC asserts no interest in the property at 
issue sufficient to confer standing to challenge title to that property. Moreover, 
the Public Waters Access Act does not provide a statutory basis for members of 
the public to assert a claim for title on the State's behalf. And USAC conceded 
that it is not seeking to quiet title to the riverbed. The district court therefore 
erred in determining that the State holds title to the riverbed. 
Moreover, the district court applied the wrong test for determining 
whether the Weber River is "navigable" for purposes of the Public Waters Access 
Act. This is because the district court applied the federal navigability for title test 
to determine access, when the Act itself has its own test for a "navigable water," 
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a test that on its face is different than the federal title test. The failure to apply the 
state test was plain error because the Act's applicability should have been 
obvious to the trial court and its application would have resulted in a more 
favorable outcome for Orange Street. 
But even if the district court did not err in applying the federal navigability 
for title test, it misinterpreted that test in two ways. First, the federal test requires 
that a river have been used for both trade and travel at statehood. The United 
States Supreme Court has consistently equated travel with boat travel, and the 
Court has never indicated that log drive evidence may substitute for evidence of 
boat travel. The district court therefore erred in finding the Weber River to be 
navigable where it crosses the landowners' properties because of the complete 
absence of evidence of statehood-era boat travel. 
Second, the federal test prohibits a finding of navigability where trade and 
travel occur only during times of temporary high water. The district court failed 
to recognize this limitation, and erred in finding the Weber River to be navigable 
based on evidence of log drives that occurred only during the spring runoff-a 
time of temporary high water. 
Argument 
This case is about whether members of the Utah Stream Access Coalition 
("USAC") are permitted to fish or otherwise use for recreational purposes the 
bed of the Weber River where it crosses the private property of Orange Street 
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Development (" Orange Street") and other private landowners. The Public 
Waters Access Act (the ✓1 Act") identifies the public waters that the public may 
use for recreational activities, and therefore is determinative of whether USAC 
may fish from this riverbed. The Act provides that the public may use for 
recreation public waters that (i) are "navigable water[s]"; (ii) are "on public 
property"; or (iii) are "on private property ... with the private property owner's 
permission." Utah Code§ 73-29-201(1), (2). 
USAC seeks to establish that it has the right to fish from Orange Street's 
riverbed under the first of these alternatives-because the Weber River, where it 
crosses Orange Street's property, is navigable under the federal navigability for 
title test. (R.8-9.) It also prays for a judgment that, as a consequence of that test, 
the State holds title to that portion of the riverbed. (R.8-9.) But USAC is not 
entitled to declaratory judgments supporting any of its claims. First, USAC lacks 
standing to challenge Orange Street's and the other landowners' title to the 
riverbed, and the district court erred in adjudicating title. Second, the district 
court failed to apply the navigability analysis specified in the Act. And third, 
even if the district court applied the correct test-the federal test of navigability 
for title-the court misinterpreted and misapplied that test. This court should 
reverse. 
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1. USAC does not have standing to ask for a declaratory judgment that the 
State holds title to the riverbed 
In Utah, standing is a jurisdictional requirement. Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 
UT 18, ,r 9, 299 P.3d 1098. Without it, a case is not "'fit for judicial resolution." 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ,r 17, 148 P.3d 
960 ( quotations omitted). Because USAC lacked standing to request a declaration 
that "title to the bed of the Weber River is held by the State of Utah," the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to issue a judgment that "the State of Utah holds 
sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber River" where it crosses the 
landowners' properties. (R.8-9,892,949.) 
The traditional test for standing "addresses whether the party has a real 
and personal interest in the dispute." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ,r 20 (quotations 
omitted). In the context of an action challengmg title, only those who may have 
claims to an interest in land have standing. As this court has phrased it, standing 
"is limited to parties who could acquire an interest in the property created by the 
court's judgment or decree.'~ Elder v. Nephi City ex rel. Brough, 2007 UT 46, ,r 20, 
~ 164 P.3d 1238. 
Here, USAC lacks standing under this test to assert a claim that another 
party- the State-holds title to the riverbed where it crosses the landowners' 
properties. USAC seeks access to the riverbed for recreational use. It is allegedly 
injured because it is prohibited from using that riverbed if the riverbed is 
privately owned and the owner does not permit access and use. Utah Code § 73-
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29-201(1), (2). USAC does not assert that it holds title to or any other possessory 
interest in the riverbed; indeed, it does not even assert that it "could acquire" any 
interest in the riverbed as a result of the court's judgment. (See R.337.) Rather, it 
asserts that the State holds title to the riverbed, and because the State holds title, it 
should have access.to the water for recreation. (R.5.) But the State itself has not 
asserted that it holds title to the riverbed or initiated a quiet title action. As this 
court has recognized, because a party with the requisite interest in land- like the 
State-may "decline to perfect his claim," parties lacking that interest should not 
be allowed to "command rulings" affecting title. Elder, 2007 UT 46, ,r 19. 
It is true that USAC's injury-in the technical sense-is affected by 
whether the State holds title to the riverbed because Utah Code section 73-29-
201(1)(a)(ii) allows access to waters II on public property." That is, if the State 
holds title to the riverbed, the riverbed is public property that USAC can use for 
recreational purposes. But the Act's premising access on public ownership of 
property does not establish a basis for members of the public to assert title on the 
State's behalf. The Act itself addresses quiet title actions that enable members of 
the public ✓1 to obtain a judicial declaration of the existence of a right to public 
recreational access" in section 73-29-204(1)(a). But that provision does not grant 
standing to USAC to assert the State's claim to title to the landowners' riverbeds 
under the equal footing doctrine. Rather, it allows the public to establish 
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recreational easements under section 73-29-203,3 not quiet title in the State or 
wrest title from private property owners. The Act therefore recognizes the right 
of the public to use public waters on existing public property or establish 
easements for such use over private property under certain conditions. It does 
not allow the public to assert and adjudicate public ownership of riverbeds on 
the State's behalf. USAC lacks standing to do just that. 
USAC likewise lacks alternative standing to raise the issue of title to the 
riverbed where it crosses the landowners' properties. A party has alternative 
standing if it can demonstrate "that it has the interest necessary to effectively 
assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual 
questions and that the issues are unlikely to be raised if [it] is denied standing." 
Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ,r 36 (quotations omitted). "[I]t must also demonstrate 
that the issues it seeks to raise are of sufficient public importance in and of 
themselves to warrant granting the party standing." Id. ,r 39. 
3 Section 73-29-203 provides as follows: 
(1) Public recreational access is established if: 
( a) the private property has been used by the public for recreational 
access requiring use of the public water for a period of at least 10 
consecutive years that begins after September 22, 1982; and 
(b) the public use has been: 
(i) continuous during the season conducive to the recreational 
access; 
(ii) open and notorious; 
{iii) adverse; and 
(iv) without interruption. 
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USAC has proved capable of assisting the court in evaluating many of the 
legal and factual issues in this case. But because it is not asserting its own interest 
in the riverbed, it cannot assist the court in making a title determination in the 
same way that parties with an interest in the property could. USAC, unlike the 
State or the landowners, will not bear responsibility for the riverbed no matter 
the result of the title determination. Only the State and the landowners can 
provide the court with a complete analysis respecting the benefits and burdens of 
holding title. And as noted above, the State has declined to assert a claim for title. 
In the context of adjudicating access to public waters for recreational purposes, 
title determinations-especially in favor of parties not seeking title-are not "of 
sufficient public importance in and of themselves to warrant granting" USAC 
standing. Id. ,r 39. 
Importantly, USAC has conceded that it "is not seeking to quiet title to the 
streambed." (R.337.) As it explained, 
[i]t seeks a right of access and use only. Depending on the ultimate 
deterrrtlnation of navigability in this case, the State may in the future 
decide to bring quiet title actions against the Landowner Defendants 
and other riparian landowners; however, neither the Coalition nor 
the State is attempting to assert such claims here. 
(R.337.) The State agreed, arguing in its closing as follows: 
The State reiterates that this is not a quiet title case. Only the State 
and private landowner claimants have standing to quiet title to the 
subject riverbed lands, and no quiet title cause of action has been 
pied. Instead, the Coalition's claims seek injunctive relief for access. 
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(R.861.) And the State specifically excluded title-related findings from its 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R.928.) 
Oddly, the district court did not acknowledge USAC' s concession, never 
addressed the State's argument or proposed findings, and did not consider the 
issue of standing. It simply concluded that "the State of Utah holds sovereign 
land title to the bed of the Weber" where it crosses the landowners' properties 
and issued a judgment to that effect in USAC's favor. (R.892,949.) In doing so, the 
court erred because USAC lacked standing to assert a claim for a declaration that 
the State holds title to the riverbed. The district court's entry of judgment 
declaring the State to hold title to the riverbed should be vacated, and USAC's 
claim for a title determination dismissed. See Gregory, 2013 UT 18, iJ 37. 
In addition to erroneously focusing on establishing title to the riverbed of 
the Weber River, the district court also erred by applying the wrong test for 
navigability. Instead, the court should have applied the definition of navigability 
found in the Public Waters Access Act itself. 
2. It was plain error for the district court to have failed to apply the 
statutory definition of ''navigable water" to the question of whether 
USAC may fish on the Weber River where it crosses the landowners' 
properties under state law 
As noted above, the operative question in this case is whether members of 
the public, including USAC, may use the bed of the Weber River where it crosses 
the landowners' properties for recreational purposes. USAC sought access on the 
basis that the river is "navigable," and that the Act grants access to "navigable 
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water." (R.8-10,560.) But in determining whether the river is navigable, the 
district court did not apply the definition of a "[n]avigable water" contained in 
the Act. Instead, it applied the federal test of navigability for title under the equal 
footing doctrine. It was plain error for the district court not to have applied the 
Act's definition. 
None of the parties raised the fact that the Act defines navigability for 
purposes of determining recreational access to public waters in terms that 
diverge from the federal title test. 4 As a result, this court should review the issue 
under the plain error standard. State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ,r 11, 154 P.3d 788. 
Under that standard, Orange Street must demonstrate that u (i) an error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ,r 15, 361 P.3d 104 
(quotations and brackets omitted). 
An error occurred in this case when the district court applied the wrong 
navigability test. The court correctly acknowledged that "[t]he issue in this case 
is whether members of the public may use for recreati.on - including fishing- the 
riverbed on the 'one-mile stretch' of the Weber River adjacent to the Landowner 
Defendants' properties." (R.868 ( emphasis added).) And the court 
4 Additionally, the parties agreed that the federal test of navigability for title was 
the operative rule. (R.561,648,739.) 
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acknowledged that "[t]his question requires the Court to determine whether the 
Weber River in this stretch is 'navigable' under the applicable legal definition." 
(R.868.) The court applied the federal test of navigability for title under the equal-
footing doctrine. (R.868-70.) But the correct legal standard is the definition of 
"[n]avigable water" in the statute itself, as section 73-29-102 clearly states that the 
definitions listed there apply to the entire Act. Utah Code§ 73-29-102; see State v. 
Jacobs, 2006 UT App 356, ,r 7, 144 P.3d 226 ("[W]hen the Legislature undertakes 
to specifically prescribe when a certain definition does and does not apply, the 
Legislature's direction is controlling."); State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 n.3 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that it would be II absurd" to look to the dictionary for 
the definition of a statutory term "where a specific definition of that very term is 
provided in the immediately preceding subsection of an integrated and carefully 
drawn statute" and that "[t]his is particularly true where the text introducing the 
definitions makes clear that the definitions are to be used throughout the entire 
statutory section"). In other words, the definition of 11navigable water" for 
purposes of this case is a question of state law, not federal law, and the state may 
adopt any definition it chooses. See Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park 
Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560,568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ("[F]or purposes of public use 
of waters, the state may adopt different and less stringent tests of navigability 
than those adopted under federal law."). 
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The error should have been obvious to the district court as "the law 
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, ,r 16, 95 P.3d 276. The district court clearly understood that 
USAC' s right to access the bed of the Weber River where it crosses the 
landowners' properties flowed from the Act. (R.868.) As a result, it should have 
been obvious to the court that the entirety of the Act applied to this case, and that 
the definitions contained therein should be used to interpret its substantive 
provisions. 
Finally, and critically, the error was harmful. The district court applied the 
federal navigability for title test, which required the court to evaluate the 
navigability of the Weber River as of the time of statehood. (R.868-70.) But the 
definition of a "[n]avigable water" in the Act has no such restriction. Utah Code 
§ 73-29-102(4). Rather, the Act states that a "'[n]avigable water' means a water 
course that in its natural state without the aid of artificial means is useful for 
commerce and has a useful capacity as a public highway of transportation." Id. 
The evidence presented at trial focused entirely on late nineteenth-century trade 
on the upper Weber River, not present-day commerce. (See R.974-77.) And while 
the parties presented some evidence of present-day boat travel on the river, that 
evidence does not establish that the Weber River where it crosses the 
landowners' properties "is useful for commerce and has a useful capacity as a 
public highway of transportation" at present. Utah Code§ 73-29-102(4); (see 
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R.975). The outcome of this matter would therefore have been more favorable to 
Orange Street had the district court applied the correct definition of navigability 
to USAC's claim for river access. 
In addition, by applying the federal test for title rather than the Act's 
definition of navigability, the district court has unsettled the titles of landowners 
to this stretch of the Weber River bed, as well as those of unnumbered Utahns 
across the state to beds of other waters. The district court's decision also raises 
serious questions about the assessment practices of counties and the legitimacy 
of property taxes imposed. 
Moreover, even if the parties' failure to raise the applicability of the Act's 
definition of II navigable water" does not meet the plain error standard, this court 
can waive the preservation rule where "controlling authority ... bears upon the 
ultimate resolution of a case." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,r 18,266 P.3d 
828. As in Patterson, where the court considered and applied a controlling statute 
despite the parties' failure to raise it, this court should II decline to ignore 
controlling law." Id. ,r 21. 
In short, the trial court committed plain error when it failed to apply the 
correct test for and legal definition of 11navigable water." This court should 
reverse on that basis.5 But even if Orange Street cannot demonstrate plain error, 
5 Alternatively, this court may remand for the district court to consider the 
application of the Act's definition of navigability to the facts. 
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this court should still reverse, as the district court erroneously interpreted and 
applied the federal test of navigability for title. 
3. The district court erroneously interpreted the federal test for 
navigability for title as being satisfied by evidence of log drives alone 
and by evidence that the river was used only during short periods of 
seasonal high water 
Under federal law, whether a particular waterway is navigable is a 
question that arises under a variety of circumstances. The United States Supreme ~ 
Court articulated the basic formulation of the test for navigability in The Daniel 
Ball, a late nineteenth-century case concerning the scope of the federal 
government's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause: "Those rivers must 
be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And 
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in 
their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel 
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." 
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870). 
This test, however, "is not applied in the same way" in all cases. PPL 
Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012). The Court has articulated 
various modifications to accommodate the needs of various types of cases. In 
cases involving questions of state title under the equal footing doctrine, 
navigability determinations must be made as of the time of statehood: "In 
accordance with the constitutional principle of the equality of states, the title to 
the beds of rivers within Utah passed to that state when it was admitted to the 
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Union, if the rivers were then navigable; and, if they were not then navigable, the 
title to the river beds remained in the United States." United States v. Utah, 283 
U.S. 64, 75 {1931). And, in contrast to cases involving admiralty jurisdiction or the 
federal commerce power, navigability for title cases require evaluation of the 
river in its "natural and ordinary condition," without improvements affecting 
navigability. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1228-29. 
While the district court acknowledged the Daniel Ball test for navigability 
and the restrictions noted above, it failed to correctly interpret and apply that test 
in two respects. First, the district court failed to acknowledge that a navigable 
river must have been used for both trade and travel at statehood, and could not 
base a finding of navigability on log drive evidence alone. Second, it failed to 
acknowledge that a river's utility for trade and travel cannot be limited to times 
of temporary high water. Because the log drives occurred only during such 
times, they could not support a finding of navigability. These errors warrant 
reversal. 
3.1 To be considered navigable, a river must have been used or 
susceptible of being used for both trade and travel at the time of 
statehood, and log drives alone are insufficient evidence of 
navigability 
The navigability test has consistently been expressed by the United States 
Supreme Court in the conjunctive. That is, its plain language requires that, at 
statehood, navigable rivers were used or susceptible of being used "as highways 
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the 
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customary modes of trade and travel on water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 
(emphases added). And because the test is expressed in the conjunctive, the 
terms trade and travel necessarily refer to different actions or requirements vis-a-
vis navigability. See Gay Hill Field Serv. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 750 P.2d 
606,608 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that when a test is conjunctive, all parts 
of the test must be satisfied). 
In every one of its navigability for title cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
examined evidence of both trade and travel in making its navigability 
determination, with trade evidenced by "useful commerce," and travel by the 
transportation of people or things by boat. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 
U.S. 49, 56 (1926). For example, in United States v. Utah, the Court considered 
whether certain sections of the Green, Colorado, and San Juan rivers were 
navigable. 283 U.S. at 71. There, the Court noted evidence of "the actual 
navigation of the rivers with full description of the size and character of boats, 
and the circumstances of use." Id. at 82. It noted the "expedition of Major John W. 
Powell down the Green and the Colorado rivers," and, years later, "a large 
number of enterprises, with boats of various sorts, including rowboats, flatboats, 
steamboats, motorboats, barges and scows, some being used for exploration, 
some for pleasure, some to carry passengers and supplies, and others in 
connection with prospecting, surveying, and mining operations." Id. at 82. As for 
trade, the Court explained that evidence of actual commercial use was not the 
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test, but the rivers' "susceptibility to use as highways of commerce." Id. Because 
the "physical characteristics" of and "uses to which the streams have been put" 
evidenced the rivers' "capacity" for useful commerce, the Court found certain 
sections of the rivers to be navigable. Id. at 83, 89. 
Likewise, in Utah v. United States, the Court detemuned the Great Salt Lake 
to be navigable based on its evaluations of both trade and boat travel. 403 U.S. 9, 
10 (1971). The Court noted late nineteenth-century evidence of "nine boats used 
from time to time to haul cattle and sheep from the mainland to one of the 
islands or from one of the islands to the mainland" and "one boat used by an 
outsider who carried sheep to an island for the owners of the sheep." Id. at 11. 
The Court also noted evidence of boats used to haul "ore, and salt, and cedar 
posts" to and from an island in the lake, as well as a boat that "was used to carry 
salt from various salt works around the lake to a railroad connection." Id. at 12. 
The evidence was "not extensive," but was sufficient to support the conclusion 
that "[t]he lake was used as a highway." Id. at 11. 
In United States v. Holt State Bank, the Court relied on evidence of trade and 
boat travel in finding a Minnesota lake navigable. 270 U.S. 49, 57 (1926). It noted 
that "[e]arly visitors and settlers ... used the river [which traversed the lake] and 
lake as a route of travel, employing the small boats of the period for the 
purpose." Id. at 56-57. And as for trade, "[m]erchants in the settlements ... which 
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were several miles up [the] river from the lake, used the river and lake in sending 
for and bringing in their supplies." Id. at 57. 
In the Court's most recent case involving navigability for title, PPL 
Montana, it viewed obstacles to boat travel as an important indicator of 
nonnavigability. 132 S. Ct. at 1231. The Court noted that Lewis and Clark had 
traveled on or alongside the Missouri River during their expedition of the 
American West. Id. at 1223. Certain segments of the river, because of their 
waterfalls, "steep cliffs and swift water," were not passable by boat, and Lewis 
and Clark "circumvent[ed] the Great Falls and their surrounding reach of river" 
by proceeding "over a more circuitous land route by means of portage." Id. The 
Court explained that these portages "defeat a finding of navigability ... because 
they require transportation over land rather than over the water."6 Id. at 1231 
( quotations omitted). 
Lack of both trade and travel led the Court in Oklahoma v. Texas to 
conclude that the Red River was nonnavigable. 258 U.S. 574,591 (1922). The 
Court explained that in the decades prior to Oklahoma's statehood, "boats of 
light draft carried merchandise up the river ... and took out cotton and other 
products on the return trip." Id. at 589. But "[t]his occurred only in period of high 
water, and was accomplished under difficulties." Id. And '' [ w ]hen the railroads 
6 Although boats were unable to safely traverse this stretch of river, it certainly 
would not have been an obstacle to logs. 
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were constructed this high-water or flood navigation ceased." Id. at 589-90. This 
evidence, the Court explained, "establishes that trade and travel neither do nor 
can move over that part of the river, in its natural and ordinary condition." Id. at 
591. 
Likewise, in United States v. Oregon, the Court found five bodies of water in 
Oregon to be nonnavigable based on the nonexistence of trade and travel. 295 
U.S. 1, 23 (1935). The Court explained that "boating which took place in the area 
involved had no commercial aspects and was of such a character as to be no 
indication of navigability." Id. at 21. Moreover, "[n]umerous witnesses who had 
lived in the vicinity for many years had never used a boat and had never, or 
rarely, seen one on the lake." Id. And though there was evidence that a few 
trappers and duck hunters used boats, "[a]ll wore gummed boots and found it 
necessary, in the use of the boats, to get out and pull them over shallow points in 
the lake." Id. In other words, "many difficulties were customarily encountered in 
the use of boats." Id. at 21-22. The evidence, therefore, was of "occasional use of 
boats, sporadic and ineffective," which, given the "flat topography" of the area, 
"shallow water," and other physical characteristics, "preclude[d] the use for 
navigation of the area in question." Id. at 23. 
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's consistent examination of evidence of 
both trade and travel when determining questions of navigability for title, USAC 
presented no evidence of statehood-era boat travel. Sara Dant testified that she 
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found no evidence of boat travel on the upper Weber River, including the 
portion of the river that crosses the landowners' properties, during the late 
nineteenth century. (R.975:76.) And while Gary Nichols testified to the types of 
boat travel possible on the upper Weber River at present, he did not testify 
regarding whether the watercraft used to travel on the Weber River today "are 
meaningfully similar to those in customary use for trade and travel at the time of 
statehood," as would be required for USAC to successfully "use present-day 
evidence for title purposes." (R.975:120-28,131-36); PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1233.7 
Rather, USAC supported its claim of navigability solely with evidence of log 
drives, and the district court grounded its finding of navigability on that 
evidence alone. (R.879-91.) But the U.S. Supreme Court has never suggested, 
much less held, that log drives- standing alone- are sufficient to constitute both 
trade and travel in support of a navigability for title determination. To the 
contrary, the Court has stated that "[t]he mere fact that logs, poles, and rafts are 
floated down a stream occasionally and in times of high water does not make it a 
navigable river." U.S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,698 (1899). 
Evidence of log drives is relevant to the trade and commerce inquiry, but a 
finding of navigability cannot be based on log drive evidence alone. Lower 
courts usually support navigability findings involving log drive evidence with 
7 PPL Montana also requires that a party seeking to use present-day boat use 
under the navigability for title test demonstrate that "the river's poststatehood 
condition is not materially different from its physical condition at statehood." 
132 S. Ct. at 1233. 
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evidence of boat travel as well. E.g., Hardy v. State Land Bd., 360 P.3d 647, 663 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2015) (holding that "the occurrence of log drives on the upper portion of 
the river post-statehood, and evidence of present-day boating use of that portion 
of the river, support the conclusion that the river's conditions at the time of 
statehood would have permitted use of the river as a highway of commerce-
that is, for timber transport and canoe-based travel and trade"); Nw. Steelheaders 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 392-95 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (finding John Day 
River at certain locations to be "actually used for travel and trade" or 
"susceptible to navigation" based on evidence of statehood-era Native American 
canoe-based trade and post-statehood "Native American canoe-based trade, log 
runs, and sternwheeler traffic"); McCormack v. State, No. 09CV1654CC (Douglas 
Cnty. Cir. Ct., Or. Dec. 7, 2010) (finding portion of North Umpqua River to be 
navigable based on evidence of pre-statehood Native American canoe use, pre-
and post-statehood use of canoes for trade and travel by settlers, post-statehood 
log drives, and present-day use of watercraft for recreation) (attached as Add. E); 
Oregon v. Tidewater Contractor, Inc., No. 93-6017-HO (D. Or. Aug. 12, 1994), 
http://www.oregon.gov/ dsl/NAV /Documents/Chetco%20River%20Lawsuit% 
201994.pdf (finding portion of Chetco River to be navigable based on evidence of 
pre-statehood canoe travel by Native Americans, post-statehood log floats, post-
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statehood transport of "tan bark" by "flat-bottomed boats," other post-statehood 
boat use, and modern recreational use and boat travel) (attached as Add. F).8 
We can find only two cases in which lower courts rely on log drive 
evidence alone to support a finding of navigability for purposes of establishing 
title. But the reasoning presented in both cases is suspect, and neither 
conclusively establishes that log drives are evidence of both trade and travel. 
First, in State of Oregon. ex rel. Division. of State Lands v. Riverfront Protection 
Ass'n, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the appropriate test for navigability for 
title. 672 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1982). As a result, it does not unambiguously stand for 
the proposition that log drive evidence alone is sufficient to support a 
navigability for title finding. In Riverfront, a magistrate judge had determined 
that the McKenzie River was not navigable at the time of Oregon's statehood. Id. 
at 794. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit cited The Daniel Ball as the source of the rule 
for navigability for title determinations, and explained that it had recently "held 
evidence of transportation of logs by river sufficient, when joined with the other 
facts of the case, to support a finding of navigability for purposes of federal 
regulatory jurisdiction under [the Federal Power Act]." Id. at 794-95. Based on 
that recent case, the court reversed the magistrate's ruling and held that the river 
8 State v. Bunkowski also falls into this category. 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972). 
Although the Nevada Supreme Court's decision references only log drives that 
occurred on the Carson River for a period of thirty-five years in finding the river 
to be navigable, the court was presented with evidence of boat travel as well. 
Appellant's Brief at 5, 7-8, State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972) (No. 6799) 
(attached as Add. G). 
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is navigable because log drives were held on the river for seventeen years during 
the statehood era. Id. at 795-96. 
But the Riverfront court not only misapplied the recent case, that other case 
applied an entirely different rule for navigability. In the recent case cited by the 
Riverfront court, Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal EnergtJ Regulaton1 
Commission, the Ninth Circuit considered evidence that shingle bolts were floated 
down the river and that the river "supported navigation by light craft, primarily 
Indian canoes" -in other words, evidence of both trade and travel. 644 F.2d 785, 
788 (9th Cir. 1981). The Riverfront court admitted as much when it described 
Puget Sound as holding that "transportation of logs by river" was sufficient to 
support a finding of navigability "when joined with the other facts of the case." 672 
F.2d at 794-95 (emphasis added). The Riverfront court therefore failed to follow 
Puget Sound when it did not require evidence of boat travel in addition to the log 
drive evidence to support its navigability finding. 
Moreover, because Puget Sound was not a navigability for title case, the 
court did not apply the navigability for title test. 644 F.2d at 787-88. Rather, it 
applied the definition of navigability appropriate to the regulatory question 
before it, which is found in the Federal Power Act. Id. at 787. But this definition 
bears little resemblance to the navigability for title test. 9 Id. Therefore, even if the 
9 According to the Puget Sound court, the Federal Power Act defined "navigable 
waters" as follows: 
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court had found that log drives alone were sufficient to support a finding of 
navigability, that finding would apply only to navigability determinations for 
purposes of the Federal Power Act. Puget Sound does not stand for the 
proposition that log drive evidence alone can support a navigability finding 
under the navigability for title test. Because it erroneously relied on a different 
navigability rule, the Riverfront court's analysis and reasoning have no relevance 
here. 
Second, the only other case supposedly relying only on log floats for a 
navigability for title finding, Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, is 
likewise suspect as precedent. 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984). There, the Montana 
Supreme Court determined the Dearborn River to be navigable at statehood 
because the river "satisfied the log-floating test for navigability under the federal 
" ... those parts of streams or other bodies of water over which 
Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate with foreign 
nations and among the several States, and which either in their 
natural or improved condition notwithstanding interruptions 
between the navigable parts of such streams or waters by falls, 
shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage, are used or suitable for 
use for the rransportation of persons or property in interstate or 
foreign commerce, including therein all such interrupting falls, 
shallows, or rapids, together with such other parts of streams as 
shall have been authorized by Congress for improvement by the 
United States or shall have been recommended to Congress for such 
improvement after investigation under its authority." 
644 F.2d at 787 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 796(8)). The test for navigability for 
Commerce Clause purposes is more broad than the test for navigability for state 
title. See Robert W. Adler, The Andent Mariner of Constitutional Law: The Historical, 
yet Declining Role of Navigability, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1643, 1673-74 (2013). 
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test of navigability for title."10 Id. at 166. But the court did not identify, define, or 
explain this so-called "log-floating test," and the cases cited by the court do not 
identify such a test.11 Id. In addition, because Curran involves a claim of 
recreation access and the court also bases its holding on navigability under state 
law, it is not clear that the unidentified federal "log-floating test" is applicable at 
all. Id. at 165, 168, 169-70 ("[T]he test of navigability for use and not for title, is a 
test to be determined under state law and not federal law."). As a result, Curran 
does not clearly stand for the proposition that log drives alone are sufficient to 
establish navigability for title under the federal test. 
Here, the district court failed to appreciate that the navigability for title test 
requires evidence of both trade and travel. In particular, it erred in relying on log 
drive evidence alone to establish that the Weber River was, "at the time of 
statehood, used and susceptible of being used, in its natural and ordinary 
condition, as [a] highway of commerce, over which trade and travel were 
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over water." (R.891.) 
Evidence of boat travel, none of which was presented by USAC, is also required. 
10 The log drive evidence consisted of the following: "[T]he Dearborn River was 
used in 1887, two years before Montana statehood, to float approximately 
100,000 railroad ties. Furthermore, in 1888 and 1889, one or two log drives per 
year were floated down the Dearborn. One drive in 1888 contained 700,000 board 
feet." Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, 682 P.2d at 166. 
11 Those cases are The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874); Sierra Pacific Power 
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 681 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983); and Riverfront Protecti.on Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792. 
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The district court cited only three cases - Bunkowski, Curran, and 
Riverfront-to support its reliance on log drive evidence. (R.870-71.) But none of 
those clearly stands for the proposition that log drives alone may support a 
finding that a river is navigable for purposes of establishing title. Nor do those 
cases appropriately rely on any U.S. Supreme Court precedents for that 
proposition. The district court here also suggested that because the U.S. Supreme 
Court's "most recent case ... addressing navigability for title," PPL Montana, 
"did not discuss the issue of log drives," it does not "rule out the potential for 
finding navigability based upon log drive evidence." (R.871.) This is true, but 
because PPL Montana involved evidence of boat travel, too, the proper inference 
to be drawn from that decision is that log drive evidence, in combination with 
evidence of boat travel, may establish the trade and travel required for a finding 
of navigability.12 132 S. Ct. at 1233-34. With due respect, to rely on PPL Montana 
as support for the contrary proposition stretches the precedent beyond 
recognition. Log drives are relevant to the issue of navigability; they just cannot 
stand as the sole evidence of it. The district court therefore lacked any persuasive 
legal authority for its determination that "the Weber River is navigable in law 
12 PPL Montana involved evidence of present-day boat use. 132 S. Ct. at 1233-34. 
The Court ruled that the Montana Supreme Court erred in considering "present-
day use of the Madison [to be] probative of its susceptibility of use at statehood" 
without further inquiry as to whether "(1) the watercraft are meaningfully 
similar to those in customary use for trade and travel at the time of statehood; 
and (2) the river's poststatehood condition is not materially different from its 
physical condition." Id. at 1233-34. The Court remanded for the Montana 
Supreme Court to consider these "necessary" issues. Id. at 1234-35. 
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where it passes by and through the Landowner Properties" and that, as a result, 
"the State of Utah holds sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber below the 
ordinary high water mark at the location of the Landowner Properties." (R.892.) 
This court should reverse. 
3.2 A river is not navigable if its utility for trade and travel is limited 
to times of temporary high water 
The district court also erred in failing to acknowledge that the Weber River 
is useful for log drives only during temporary times of high water, and, as a 
result cannot be considered navigable for purposes of the federal test for title. 
While a river need not be navigable year-round to meet the test, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has explained that a river is not navigable if it is useful for trade 
and travel 11only in times of temporary high water." Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 
698-99. In other words, "[w]hile ... a river need not be susceptible of navigation 
at every point during the year, neither can that susceptibility be so brief that it is 
not a commercial reality." PPL Mont. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1234. 
For example, in Oklahoma v. Texas, the Court evaluated evidence that boats 
could be operated on the Red River only during "intermittent" periods of high 
water "of irregular and short duration." 258 U.S. 574,589 (1922). These periods 
occurred 11when the rainfall is running off" and lasted "from 1 to 7 days and in 
the aggregate seldom cover[ ed] as much as 40 days a year." Id. at 587. The Court 
explained that because the river's use for transportation "has been and must be 
exceptional, and confined to the irregular and short periods of temporary high 
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water," it is not navigable. Id. at 591. "A greater capacity for practical and 
beneficial use in commerce is essential to establish navigability." Id. 
This "greater capacity" was evident in United States v. Utah. 283 U.S. 64 
(1931). There, the Court observed that the Green, Grand, and Colorado Rivers' 
"susceptibility of use as a highway for commerce was not confined to exceptional 
conditions or short periods of temporary high water, but that during at least nine 
months of each year the river[ s] ordinarily [were] susceptible of such use as a 
highway for commerce." Id. at 87 (quotations omitted). The Court found the 
rivers to be navigable. Id. at 89. 
Oklahoma and Utah represent opposite ends of the navigability spectrum, at 
least with respect to the prohibition on use confined to times of temporary high 
water. Few of the log drive cases supply enough detail to be placed on this 
spectrum, but those that do support that rivers are nonnavigable if their utility is 
limited to times of temporary high water. 
In Oregon ex rel. Division of State Lands v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, the 
Ninth Circuit enforced the "temporary high water" restriction and explained that 
log drives on the McKenzie River, which it found to be navigable, did not occur 
during times of high water or low water, but when the level of the river was 
somewhere in between during a three-month period of the year. 672 F.2d 792, 
795 (9th Cir. 1982). Riverfront, to the extent its reasoning and analysis is reliable,13 
13 See supra section 3.1, explaining that Riverfront applied the wrong test for 
navigability. 
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therefore suggests that log drives that rely on high water cannot be used to 
establish navigability. 
The Eighth Circuit agrees. In North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and 
School Lands v. United States, the court examined evidence of a single tie drive on 
the Little Missouri River that occurred "only ... with the benefit of high waters." 
972 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1992). Because the drive "was an isolated venture that 
was only partially successful because of unusually high water," and in 
combination with limited evidence of boat travel on the river, the court found the 
river to be nonnavigable. Id. at 239-40. 
The district court did not consider that navigability cannot be based on 
evidence of trade and travel that occurs during "times of temporary high water." 
Rather, the court analyzed the evidence of the short time the Weber's water was 
high enough for log drives as a question of whether a waterway could be 
navigable if its utility for trade and travel was seasonal. The court explained that 
seasonality did not prevent navigability: 
The fact that, during certain seasons of a year, a waterway may not 
be useful for commerce or trade should not bar a finding of 
navigability. Some navigable waterways may not be passable due to 
ice or freezing during winter seasons. Others may not be useful for 
commerce during high runoff periods, while others may not be 
useful for commerce during low runoff periods. This Court 
concludes that evidence of seasonality of commerce on a waterway 
should not bar a finding of navigability, provided that the waterway 
was regularly used for commerce on a seasonal basis, and was not 
dependent on unusual conditions for use in commerce. 
(R.871.) 
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But the U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted a rule that rivers that are 
"regularly used for commerce on a seasonal basis" are navigable. Rather, it has 
made clear that navigable rivers' utility may not be limited to "times of 
temporary high water." Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 698-99. The district court 
therefore erred not only by failing to recognize and evaluate that limitation, but 
by fashioning a rule focused on "regular" and "seasonal" use. 
Moreover, an application of the court's own findings to the rule 
prohibiting navigability based on use during "times of temporary high water" 
would result in a finding of nonnavigability. In its findings of fact, the court 
stated that "[l]~e many mountain rivers in the West, the bulk of the Weber's 
flow comes in the spring runoff season, typically during the months of May and 
June." (R.876.) The court found that spring flows are capable of floating logs and 
that "general conditions and characteristics on the Upper Weber during the 
statehood era or in 1896 were not materially different than present-day 
conditions and characteristics." (R.877-78.) And the court heard testimony that 
the log drives on the Weber River occurred during the spring runoff (R.974:107-
09,138,170,208,229;977:35-36.) Because those spring runoff flows are "times of 
temporary high water," evidence of trade and travel that occur during those 
times cannot establish navigability regardless of whether the runoff is "regular." 
This court should reverse. 
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Conclusion 
The district court erred in concluding that the State holds title to the bed of 
the Weber River where it crosses Orange Street's property because USAC lacks 
standing to challenge title. The district court also plainly erred in failing to apply 
the applicable statutory test for navigability. And even if the district court did 
apply the correct test for navigability, it misinterpreted and misapplied that test. 
This court should reverse. 
DATED this 25th day of January, 2016. 
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§ 73-29-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 73-29-102 
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code}umotated 
Title 73. Water and Inigation 
Chapter 29. Public Waters Access Act 
Part 1. General Provisions 
As used in this chapter: 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-29-102 
§ 73-29-102. Definitions 
Currentness 
(I) "Division" means the Division of Wildlife Resources. 
(2) "Floating access" means the right to access public water flowing over private property for floating and fishing while floating 
upon the water. 
(3) "Impounded wetlands" means a wetland or wetland pond that is formed or the level of which is controlled by a dike, berm, 
or headgate that retains or manages the flow or depth of water, including connecting channels. 
(4) "Navigable water" means a water course that in its natural state without the aid of artificial means is useful for commerce 
and has a useful capacity as a public highway of transportation. 
(5) "Private property to which access is restricted" means privately owned real property: 
(a) that is cultivated land, as defined in Section 23-20-14; 
(b) that is: 
(i) properly posted, as defmed in Section 23-20-14; 
(ii) posted as described in Subsection 76-6-206(2)(b )(iii); or 
(iii) posted as described in Subsection 76-6-206.3(2)( c ); 
( c) that is fenced or enclosed as described in: 
N~;,:t © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 73-29-102. Definitions, UT ST § 73-29-102 
(i) Subsection 76-6-206(2)(b )(ii); or 
(ii) Subsection 76-6-206.3(2)(b ); or 
( d) that the owner or a person authorized to act on the owner's behalf has requested a person to leave as provided by: 
(i) Section 23-20-14; 
(ii) Subsection 76-6-206(2)(b)(i); or 
(iii) Subsection 76-6-206.3(2)(a). 
(6) "Public access area" means the limited part of privately owned property that: 
(a) lies beneath or within three feet of a public water or that is the most direct, least invasive, and closest means of portage 
around an obstruction in a public water; and 
(b) is open to public recreational access under Section 73-29-203; and 
(c) can be accessed from an adjoining public assess area or public right-of-way. 
(7) "Public recreational access" means the right to engage in recreational access established in accordance with Section 
73-29-203. 
(8)(a) "Public water" means water: 
(i) described in Section 73-1-1; and 
(ii) flowing or collecting on the surface: 
(A) within a natural or realigned channel; or 
(B) in a natural lake, pond, or reservoir on a natural or realigned channel. 
(b) "Public water" does not include water flowing or collecting: 
·-··--·-···-----------------
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§ 73-29-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 73-29-102 
(i) on impounded wetland; 
(ii) on a migratory bird production area, as defined in Section 23-28-102; 
(iii) on private property in a manmade: 
(A) irrigation canal; 
(B) irrigation ditch; or 
(C) impoundment or reservoir constructed outside of a natural or realigned channel; or 
(iv) on a jurisdictional wetland described in 33 C.F.R. 328.3. 
(9)(a) "Recreational access" means to use a public water and to touch a public access area incidental to the use of the public 
water for: 
(i) floating; 
(ii) fishing; or 
(iii) waterfowl hunting conducted: 
(A) in compliance with applicable law or rule, including Sections 23-20-8, 73-29-203, and 76-10-508; and 
(B) so that the individual who engages in the waterfowl hunting shoots a fireann only while within a public access area 
and no closer than 600 feet of any dwelling. 
(b) "Recreational access" does not include: 
(i) hunting, except as provided in Subsection (9)(a)(iii); 
(ii) wading without engaging in activity described in Subsection (9)(a); or 
(iii) any other activity. 
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§ 73-29-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 73-29-102 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 410, § 5, eff. May 11, 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-29-102, UT ST§ 73-29-102 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document © .2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 73-29-201. General access provisions, UT ST§ 73-29-201 
KeyCite Yellow Flag -Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 73. Water and Irrigation 
Chapter 29. Public Waters Access Act 
Part 2. Recreational Access to Public Water 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-29-201 
§ 73-29-201. General access provisions 
Currentness 
(I) The public may use a public water for recreational activity if: 
(a) the public water: 
(i) is a navigable water; or 
(ii) is on public property; and 
(b) the recreational activity is not otherwise prohibited by law. 
(2) A person may access and use a public water on private property for any lawful purpose with the private property owner's 
permission. 
(3) A person may not access or use a public water on private property for recreational purposes if the private property is property 
to which access is restricted, unless public recreational access is established under Section 73-29-203. 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 410, § 7, eff. May 11, 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-29-201, UT ST§ 73-29-201 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document 
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IN THE TIIlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




JAMES FULLER PARK As Trustee of the 
Revocable Trust Of James Fuller Park; ORANGE 
STREET DEVELOPlVIENT, A Utah limited 
partnership; WENDELL J. STEMBRIDGE and ILA 
D. STEMBRIDGE, as Trustees of the Wendell J. 
Stembridge lntervivos Revocable Trust dated the29th 
day ofNovember 1988; VERN G. STEMBRIDGE 
and DOROTHY MECHAM STEMBRIDGE, as 
Trustees of The Vern G. Stembridge And Dorothy M. 
Stembridge Trust dated December 7, 1989; UTAH 
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES, an agency 
of the State ofUtah; the UTAH DIVISION OF 
PARKS AND RECREATION, an agency of the State 
ofUtah; and SHERIFF DAVID A. EDMUNDS, in 
his official capacity as Summit County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
LEGAL ANALY~IS, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 110500360 
Judge Keith A. Kelly 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on February 6 and 9-11, 2015. 
Closing argument was held on March 4, 2015. W. Cullen Battle and Craig C. Coburn appeared 
as counsel for Plaintiff Utah Stream Access Coalition (the "Coalition"). Anthony W. Schofield 
and Peter C. Schofield appeared as counsel for Defendant Orange Street Properties. Michael S. 
Johnson and Douglas J. Crapo appeared as counsel for the State of Utah, Division of Forestry, 
Fire & State Lands, having been substituted for the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources and the 
Utah Division of Parks and Recreation. Jared G. Parkinson, as counsel for Defendant Park, and 
Scott A. Dubois, as counsel for the Stembridge Defendants, were excused by stipulation. 
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Defendants Orange Street, Park and Stembridge will be referred to as the "Landowner 
Defendants." 
Having received, heard and considered the pleadings, evidence, testimony and arguments 
of counsel, the Court issues the following legal analysis, findings of fact, and conclusions oflaw. 
I. Legal Analysis: 
The issue in this case is whether members of the public may use for recreation -
including fishing-the riverbed on the "one-mile stretch" of the Weber River adjacent to the 
Landowner Defendants' properties. 
This question requires the Court to determine whether the Weber River in this stretch is 
"navigable" under the applicable legal definition. The Plaintiff Coalition asserts that the Weber is 
navigable under federal law where it passes through Landowner Defendants' properties. If the 
Weber River is considered navigable at that location, then the riverbed is state sovereign land 
and members of the public have the right under state law to use it for recreation. National Parks 
and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 919-20 (Utah 1993) (state 
has a public trust obligation to protect "public recreational uses [ of sovereign lands] for the 
benefit of the public at large"); Utah Code §73-29-201(1) ("[t]he public may use a public water 
for recreational activity if the public water ... is a navigable water"). 1 
The issue of State ownership of the bed of the Weber River is based upon whether it was 
considered navigable at statehood on January 4, 1896. At statehood, Utah gained sovereign title 
to the beds of all waters in the State then navigable. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S.Ct. 
I In Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48, 194 P .3d 897, the Utah Supreme Court held that the public has a right to use 
the beds of all waters in the state. But this ruling, based on the public ownership of waters, and not on their capacity 
for navigation, appears to have been ovenuled in 2010 when the Utah Legislature passed the Public Waters Access 
Act, Utah Code §73-29-101, er seq. As state law stands today, Utahans are allowed to use the beds of rivers where 
they cross private lands only if the rivers are navigable for title purposes under federal law. 
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1215, 1227 (2012). Under the equal footing doctrine, title passed automatically at statehood. Id, 
see also Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987); National Parks 
and Conservation Association, 869 P.2d at 917. 
There was no enumeration of which waters in the State were navigable at statehood. 
Instead, navigability must be determined case by case under the following test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1871): 
The test by which to determine the navigability of our rivers is found in their navigable 
capacity. Those rivers are public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. 
Rivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their 
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be 
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. 
The Daniel Ball test, sometimes referred to as the "navigability-in-fact" rule, continues to 
apply today in navigability cases brought to determine riverbed ownership, and must be applied 
to the Weber River in this case. See PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct. at 1228. 
Two additional elements are added to the Daniel Ball test to determine whether a water 
body is navigable for title purposes. First, under the equal footing doctrine, navigability is 
determined at the time of statehood, when title is deemed to have passed. Id This means that a 
waterway navigable at statehood will always remain so, regardless of post-statehood changes in 
conditions. See id. Second, navigability for title is based on the "natural" and ordinary condition 
of the water. Id (quoting Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922)). This element 
eliminates waters that are made navigable only by artificial improvements. 
Thus, the Daniel Ba/I/navigability-for-title test consists of five elements: 
1. Use or susceptibility of use of a waterway; 
2. In its natural and ordinary condition; 
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3. As a highway of commerce; 
4. At statehood; and 
5. In the customary modes of trade and travel over water. 
If the Weber River meets this test where it passes through the Landowner Defendants' 
Properties at the one-mile stretch, then the riverbed at that location is state sovereign land and the 
public has the right to use it for recreation. 
Determining navigability is not limited to considering whether ships or boats can pass 
through the Weber River at the one-mile stretch. Navigability can be based upon proof of use of 
the river for other forms of commerce at the time of statehood. The United States Supreme Court 
explains that navigability depends on whether ''the stream in its natural and ordinary condition 
affords a channel for useful commerce." United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931) (quoting 
in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 56 (1926)). The Court adds that "'the true test 
of the navigability of a stream does not depend on the mode by which commerce is, or may be, 
conducted, nor the difficulties attending navigation,, and that 'it would be a narrow rule to hold 
that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it 
could not be treated as a public highway."' Id (quoting The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 441-442 
(1874)2). 
Consistent with this authority, two state supreme courts and one federal appellate court 
have ruled that log drives are a basis for establishing navigability in a title case. State v. 
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d. 1231, 1233-36 (Nev. 1972); Montana Coalition/or Stream Access v. 
2 The recent decision of PPL Montana distinguished The Montello decision, explaining that it did not address 
navigability "for title purposes," but dealt with navigability for purposes of determining federal government 
regulation ofboattravel. See PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct. at 123lw22. The UnitedStatesv. Utah decision quoted in the 
preceding paragraph, however, addressed the issue ofnavigability for purposes determining title. 270 U.S. at 71 {the 
United States sought to quiet title to the beds of portions of the Green, Colorado and San Juan rivers within Utah). 
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Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 166-68 (Mont. 1984); Oregon Division of State Lands v. Riverfront 
Protection Association, 672 F.2d 792, 794-96 (9th Cir. 1982). 
The PPL Montana case is the most recent case from the United States Supreme Court 
addressing navigability for title. See 132 S.Ct. at 1226-29. In the PPL Montana case, however, 
the United States Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of log drives and did not rule out the 
potential for finding navigability based upon log drive evidence. See id at 1236 (remanding for 
consideration of navigability issues).3 Thus, the PPL Montana decision does not overrule earlier 
authorities that based navigability determinations on evidence of log drives, and it does not bar a 
determination of navigability of the one-mile stretch of the Weber River based upon log-drive 
evidence. 
The Court has also considered arguments concerning the seasonality of log drives or 
other navigational uses. The fact that, during certain seasons of a year, a waterway may not be 
useful for commerce or trade should not bar a finding of navigability. Some navigable waterways 
may not be passable due to ice or freezing during winter seasons. Others may not be useful for 
commerce during high runoff periods, while others may not be useful for commerce during low 
runoff periods. This Court concludes that evidence of seasonality of commerce on a waterway 
should not bar a finding of navigability, provided that the waterway was regularly used for 
commerce on a seasonal basis, and was not dependent on unusual conditions for use in 
commerce. See PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct. at 1234 ("While ... a river need not be susceptible of 
navigation at every point during the year, neither can that susceptibility be so brief that it is not a 
3 The Montana Supreme Court decision in PPL Montana mentioned log drive evidence, see PPL Montana. UC v. 
State, 229 P.3d 421, ~ 27 (referencing Jog drives on the Madison River), reversed by PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct. 1215, 
but in reversing the state court decision, the United States Supreme Court decision did not discuss this evidence. 
Rather, it remanded to the Montana state courts for consideration of the evidence-presumably including log drive 
evidence- in light of the Court's decision. PPL Montana, 132 s.a. at 1236. 
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commercial reality.") Evidence of regular seasonal commerce can satisfy the Daniel 
Ball/navigability-for-title test. 
In hearing the evidence in this case, the Court was presented with evidence that federal 
surveyors in the 19th Century did not "meander" the Weber River by establishing boundaries 
based upon the edge of the river. This is not persuasive to this Court. A decision to meander a 
river in a survey may indicate that the surveyors thought the river was navigable for practical 
purposes. But a failure to meander a river could be based upon any number ofreasons, including 
budget constraints or a desire to complete the survey without the complexity of determining 
meander lines. More importantly, in this case there is no evidence that the surveyors of the 
Weber River basin were aware of the legal standards for navigability as laid out in the Daniel 
Ball/navigability-for-title test. Thus their failure to meander the Weber River is not relevant to 
this Court's decision. 
Under the applicable authorities, the Court considers both pre-statehood and post-
statehood evidence of commercial use of the Weber River, provided that such evidence is 
probative of conditions and commercial uses, or susceptibility of commercial uses, at statehood. 
PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct. at 1233; Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971); United States v. 
Utah, 283 U.S. at 76, 82-83. 
II. Findings of Fact: 
Based upon the preceding legal analysis, the Court has weighed the evidence and makes 
the following findings of fact. 
a. Background to the Dispute 
1. Defendant James Fuller Park is the trustee of the Revocable Trust of James 
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Fuller Park ("Park"), which owns real property abutting the Weber River in 
Summit County, Utah, more specifically described as Parcel No. CD-33 in the 
tax records of Summit County (''the Park Property"). 
2. Defendant Orange Street, a Utah limited partnership, owns real property 
~ 
abutting the Weber River in Summit County, Utah, more specifically described 
as Parcel No. CD-32 in the tax records of Summit County ("the Orange Street 
property"). 
3. Defendants Wendell J. Stembridge and Ila D. Stembridge are the trustees of the 
Wendell J. Stembridge Intervivos Revocable Trust dated the 29th day of 
November 1988, which owns real property abutting the Weber River in h I. r 
Summit County, Utah, more specifically described as Parcel No. CD-161 in the r· 
tax records of Summit County. 
4. Defendants Vern G. Stembridge and Dorothy Mecham Stembridge are trustees 
of the Vern G. Stembridge and Dorothy M. Stembridge Trust dated December 
7, 1989, which owns real property abutting the Weber River in Summit 
County, Utah, more specifically described as Parcel No. CD-99 in the tax 
@ records of Summit County. The properties identified in paragraphs a and a are ' !· 
referred to as the Stembridge properties. 
5. Orange Street, Park, and the Stembridges are collectively referred to as the 
"Landowner Defendants" and their properties as the "Landowner Properties." 
The "One Mile Stretch" consists of the course of the Weber River adjacent to 
the Landowner Properties. The Landowner Properties are a group of parcels 
April 10, 2015 02:02 PM 7of2~ 
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along a three mile stretch of the Weber River, but which together are 
approximately one mile in length. 
6. In the past, the Coalition's members and the public at large used the streambed 
of the Weber at this location for fishing and other recreational purposes. 
(Stipulation ofFacts for Purposes ofTrial, dated January 21, 2015.) 
7. The Landowner Defendants assert ownership of the bed of the Weber where it 
passes through the Landowner Properties. Currently, "no trespassing" signs 
prohibit public recreational use of the riverbed at this location. As a result, the 
Coalition's members have stopped using the riverbed at this location. (Id.) 
8. The Coalition asserts that the Weber River is navigable where it passes through 
the Landowner Properties and that the riverbed is state sovereign land open to 
public recreational use under state law. The Landowner Defendants assert that 
the Weber is not navigable, that they consequently own the riverbed adjacent to 
their properties, and that they are entitled to restrict or exclude public use of the 
riverbed under state law. (Id.) 
9. The Coalition's members desire to resume their use of the riverbed of the 
Weber at this location for fishing and other lawful recreational purposes. If 
allowed by a ruling of this court, they would do so immediately. (Id) 
b. Physical Characteristics of the Upper Weber River 
10. The Weber River's headwaters lie high in Utah's Uintah Mountains. (Exhibits 
1, 100.) From there the river winds for 125 miles, west to Oakley, Utah, then 
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and Weber (30 miles) counties to its final destination in the Great Salt Lake. 
(Exhibits 1, 100.) The major tributary is the Ogden River, which joins the 
Weber River approximately twelve miles upstream from the mouth. (Exhibit 
100.) Other tributaries such as Cottonwood, East Canyon, Lost, Echo, Chalk, 
Silver and Beaver creeks also augment the Weber's flow along its course. 
(Exhibit I 00.) 
11. For purposes of this case, the Weber River can be divided into two sections -
the Upper Weber from its headwaters near Holiday Park to Echo, Utah 
(approximately 40 miles, which includes the Landowner Properties) and the 
Lower Weber from Echo to the Great Salt Lake (approximately 80 miles). 
12. The most useful stream gauge for measuring the flow of the Upper Weber is 
the Oakley Gauge located approximately 6 miles upstream of the Landowner 
Properties near Oakley, Utah. This gauge has been in operation since 1905, 
nine years after statehood. Although some upstream irrigation diversions and 
one impoundment reduce the flows measured at the Oakley Gauge, this gauge 
is the best available source of natural stream flow data on the Upper Weber 
River. (Hasenyager testimony.) 
13. The Oakley Gauge is located above the confluence with Beaver Creek, a 
significant tributary that joins the Upper Weber before it reaches the 
Landowner Properties. (Id.) 
14. Since 1905, the average mean annual flow of the Upper Weber recorded at the 
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average flow of the river for the entire year. (Exhibit 101.) 
15. Like many mountain rivers in the West, the bulk of the Weber's flow comes in 
the spring runoff season, typically during the months of May and June. 
(Hasenyager testimony; Exhibit 128.) 
16. Since 1905, the average of the highest mean flow for any two-month period at 
the Oakley Gauge is 783 cfs. Mean monthly flow is the average flow of the 
river for the entire month. (Exhibit 101; see also Exhibit 128.) 
17. Since 1905, annual peak flow of the Upper Weber at the Oakley Gauge has 
averaged 1889 cfs. Annual peak flow is the highest flow in the river in a given 
year. (Id.) 
18. Since 1905, mean daily spring flows at the Oakley Gauge have exceeded 500 
cfs an average of 44 days per year, 800 cfs an average of 26 days per year, and 
1,000 cfs an average 18 days per year. Mean daily flow is the average flow of 
the river for the entire day. (Exhibit 128, p. I.) 
19. During its site visit to the Upper Weber on June 9, 2014, the Court observed 
the Weber River at various locations when the flow at the Oakley Gauge was 
approximately 530 cfs. (Hasenyager testimony.) 
20. In addition, the Court viewed a video of flows taken at the same locations on 
May 28, 2014, when flows were approximately 1450 cfs at the Oakley Gauge. 
(Exhibit 63.) 
21. Mean annual flow during 20 I 4 was 177 cfs, approximately 82% of normal. 
(Exhibit 35; Hasenyager testimony.) 
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22. The above-referenced data from the Oakley Gauge quantifies flows and 
describes flow regimes on the Upper Weber from 1905 to present. The only 
evidence of differences between statehood and post-statehood conditions on 
the Upper Weber consists of dams, reservoirs and diversions, mostly 
constructed since the 1930s, that diminish present-day flows below the Oakley 
Gauge. (Hasenyager testimony; Dant testimony.) Accordingly, the Court finds 
that present-day flows on the Upper Weber above the Oakley are not materially 
different than they were at statehood, and that conditions at statehood below 
Oakley were more favorable than present-day flows for the commercial uses at 
issue in this case. 
23. The Court finds the expert testimony of the Coalition's expert witness Gary C. 
Nichols to be persuasive on the present-day conditions and characteristics of 
the Upper Weber and the flows at which it is capable of floating small 
recreational boats and cut logs 8-10 ft. long during normal spring flows. 
24. The average and generally continuous gradient of the Upper Weber from 
Holiday Park to Wanship is 65 feet per mile. (Stipulation Concerning River 
Gradients & Federal Survey Facts ,r 13; Exhibit 113; Nichols Testimony.) That 
is, the river falls vertically 65 feet for every mile it runs horizontally. The 
Weber River's overall gradient is approximately 47 feet per mile. (Id.) 
25. From Holiday Park to W anship, the character of the Upper Weber during 
spring flows is fast and continuous small Class 1-3 rapids. The riverbed is 
comprised of cobbles/river-rock. While there is some braiding, there are no 
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waterfalls, impassable gorges or other pennanent natural obstacles to 
navigation by small recreational boats or cut logs 8-10 ft. long during normal 
spring flows. (Nichols testimony.) 
26. From Wanship to Echo, the character of the Upper Weber during spring flows 
is similar, albeit somewhat slower and deeper Class 1-2 rapids. Again, the 
riverbed is comprised of cobbles/river-rock and, while there is some braiding, 
there are no waterfalls, impassable gorges or other permanent natural obstacles 
to navigation by small recreational boats or cut logs 8-10 feet long during 
normal spring flows. (Id.) 
27. Presently, the Upper Weber can easily float small recreational boats and cut 
logs 8-10 ft. in length at flows above 500 cfs. (Id.) 
28. The only evidence of differences between statehood and present-day conditions 
on the Upper Weber consists of the dams, reservoirs and diversions mentioned 
above. In the absence of evidence suggesting otherwise, and given the history 
of documented statehood-era log drives on the Upper Weber, the Court finds 
that general conditions and characteristics on the Upper Weber during the 
statehood era or in 1896 were not materially different than present-day 
conditions and characteristics. 
29. No portion of the Upper Weber was meandered in the original federal land 
surveys of the area. (Stipulation Concerning River Gradients and Federal Land 
Survey Facts.) 
12 of 26 
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c. Statehood Era Commercial Uses of the Weber River 
30. The Court finds the expert testimony of the Coalition's expert witness Dr. Sara 
Dant to be persuasive on the history of statehood era commercial uses of the 
Weber River and other rivers in the region. 
31. In 1852, Robert Gardner, a prominent early pioneer sawmill operator, surveyed 
the Weber River for ''timber and floating purposes" from the mouth oflower 
Weber Canyon to the headwaters, including the section passing through the 
Landowner Properties. He found the River generally to be good for log 
floating. (Exhibit 2.) 
32. In the 1850s and l 860s, logs were floated down the Lower Weber to sawmills 
at Morgan and Uintah, Utah. The historical record does not indicate how far up 
the River these log floats started, or whether they passed through the 
Landowner Properties. (Exhibits 3-6.) 
33. In 1868, the Transcontinental Railroad brought the railroad tie industry to the 
Central Rockies and the Intermountain West. Men called "tie hacks" cut and 
hewed millions of railroad ties in the high mountains and transported them by 
river for the building and maintaining of the western railroads. (Exhibit 12; 
Dant testimony.) 
34. River drives were a critical component of the railroad and railroad tie 
industries. Rivers that connected the timber forests in the mountains with a 
railroad line were chosen for these drives. (Id.) 
35. During the fall and winter, tie hacks cut and hewed ties in the forest and 
13 of 26 
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skidded or hauled them by sled to the streamside. During spring runoff, the ties 
were released into the river and driven downstream to the rail connection. On 
most rivers, tie drives could dependably occur during spring runoff, although 
normal flows at other times of the year might be insufficient for drives. (Id.) 
36. Tie drives first occurred in northeastern Utah in 1868 on the Bear and Blacks 
Fork Rivers. (Id.) 
37. In 1869, the Union Pacific extended the Transcontinental Railroad to Echo, 
Utah, and established a connection between the railroad and the Upper Weber 
River. (Dant testimony.) 
i. Railroad Tie Drives on the Upper Weber 
38. The first documented tie drive on the Upper Weber occurred in the spring of 
1877. This drive started in the headwaters of the Weber near Holiday Park, 
proceeded downstream to the rail line at Echo, Utah, and along the way it 
passed through the Landowner Properties. (Exhibits 8-11; Dant testimony; 
Rodgers testimony.) 
39. This drive was conducted by Coe and Carter, a primary provider of railroad 
ties to the Union Pacific Railroad. (Exhibit 9; Exhibit 11, p. 89; Exhibit 12, pp. 
22-26.) Henry Sornsen was the foreman of the crew, and a tie hack named 
George Carter drowned during the drive a short distance above the confluence 
with Smith and Morehouse Creek. (Id.) 
40. The ties were likely used for Union Pacific branch lines in the area. (Dant 
testimony.) 
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41. A news report from Peoa stated that "large numbers" of ties were transported 
during this drive. (Exhibit 8.) 
42. Another tie drive occurred in 1879, starting in upper Weber canyon and 
passing through the Landowner Properties. (Exhibit 20, pp. 194-95; Exhibit 11, 
p. 5; Exhibit 81; Dant testimony; Rodgers testimony.) 
43. At least one and probably two documented drives occurred in the spring of 
1880 to supply ties for two competing rail lines under construction from Echo 
to Park City. These lines were the Union Pacific's broad gauge Summit County 
Railway, and the locally owned narrow gauge Utah Eastern Railway. Each line 
required at least 60,000 railroad ties. These drives originated at the "head of 
Weber River" which came to be known as Holiday Park. The drives went to 
Echo, passing through the Landowner Properties. (Exhibits 13-15; Dant 
testimony; Alexander testimony; Rodgers testimony.) 
44. After the completion of the two rail lines to Park City, Samuel Liddiard 
constructed a log boom on the Weber River at Wanship, where the new rail 
lines crossed the river on their way to Park City. (Exhibit 14.) 
45. In 1881, "a Peoa man" drove at least 42,000 ties from the upper Weber canyon, 
passing through the Landowner Properties to W anship, where Samuel Liddiard 
removed them from the river at the boom. (Id.; Dant testimony; Alexander 
testimony; Rodgers testimony.) This drive supplied ties to the Union Pacific 
Railroad, probably for the Oregon Short Line, a major regional line then under 
construction. (Dant testimony.) 
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46. During the winter of 1881-82, the Union Pacific ran newspaper ads seeking 
100 woodchoppers to cut ties on the Weber River and its branches. (Exhibit 
16.) 
47. In the spring of 1882, Henry Goddard, working for the Johnson and Liddiard 
Company, drove railroad ties from the "head of Weber River" to Wanship for 
the Union Pacific Railroad, probably for the Oregon Short Line. This drive also 
passed through the Landowner Properties. (Exhibit 17, p. 2; Dant testimony; 
Rodgers testimony.) 
48. The fact that the Union Pacific sought 100 tie cutters that winter suggests that 
the 1882 drive contained a very large number of railroad ties. (Dant testimony.) 
49. During the winter of 1882-83, the Union Pacific ran a newspaper ad seeking 25 
woodchoppers to cut ties on the Weber River and its tributaries. (Exhibit 18.) 
50. Given what happened during the previous years, this ad suggests a strong 
possibility that a tie drive occurred in the spring of 1883, passing through the 
Landowner Properties. (Dant testimony.) 
5 I. In the spring of 1896, the Salt Lake Tribune reported that the Salt Lake & 
Pacific Railroad was "getting out a large number [of railroad ties] in Weber 
canyon." (Exhibit 21.) 
52. At the time, a reference to "Weber canyon" in the context of railroad tie cutting 
was a reference to the upper Weber canyon above Oakley. (Dant testimony; see 
Exhibit 20, p. 194; Exhibit 22, p. 104; Exhibit 43; Exhibit 46, p. 79.) 
53. There is no record at any time of large quantities of railroad ties or other raw 
16 of 26 
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timber products having been hauled overland from upper Weber canyon. (Dant 
testimony; Rodgers testimony.) 
54. Given the high cost of overland hauling versus river driving, such an endeavor 
would have been economically infeasible. (Exhibit 3, p. 189; Exhibit 12, p. 9; 
Exhibit 52, pp. 24-25, 50) 
55. Accordingly, it is more probable than not that the Salt Lake & Pacific ties were 
driven down the Upper Weber past the Landowner Properties to Wanship 
about 1896. (Dant testimony.) 
56. It is likely that other tie drives occurred on the Upper Weber during the 1870s 
through the 1890s that would have passed through the Landowner Properties, 
although exact dates and circumstances are not specifically documented in the 
historical record. (Dant testimony.) The likelihood of these additional drives is 
demonstrated by the foliowing: 
a. A 1914 news article containing a regional forester's reflections on 
the history of logging in the Kamas area states that 25 or 30 years 
earlier "Keefer & Thompson drove ties down Beaver Creek to 
Wanship five or six times ... " (Exhibit 19.) These drives would 
have passed through the Landowner Properties. (Id.) 
b. The biography ofHenry Sornsen, the foreman of the 1877 Coe and 
Carter drive, states that he worked at least three years on the 
Weber River. (Exhibit 11, p. 5.) 
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ii. Railroad Ties Drives on Nearby Rivers 
57. From the late 1860s until the 1930s railroad tie drives were a common practice 
on rivers in northeastern Utah, and across the Intennountain West and the 
Central Rocky Mountain Region. (Exhibit 12, p. 264; Dant testimony.) 
58. Numerous tie drives occurred on the Provo River from the late 1870s to the 
early to mid-1890s, on the Upper Bear River (from its headwaters in Utah to 
Evanston, Wyoming) and on the Blacks Fork River (from its headwaters in 
Utah to Granger, Wyoming) from 1868 until the l 930s. (Dant testimony; 
Exhibits 17, 53-58.) 
59. For instance, tie drives have been documented on the Provo River in 1879, 
1881, 1882, 1888, 1890, 1891, 1893, and 1894. (Danttestimony.) 
60. As with the Upper Weber, the tie drives on these rivers were perfonned during 
spring runoff conditions. (Dant testimony; Exhibits 17, 53-58.) 
61. Like the Weber, these rivers originate in the western Uinta Mountains. They 
are similar in size and flow to the Upper Weber, and have similar 
characteristics in terms of seasonal runoff, bed composition, some braiding, 
continuous steep gradients, Class 1-3 rapids and no permanent obstacles to 
navigation by small recreational boats or cut logs during normal spring flows. 
(Exhibit I; Exhibit 59; Nichols testimony.) In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, and given the history of documented statehood-era drives on these 
rivers, the Court finds that these similarities also existed in the statehood era. 
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iii. Mining Timber and Cord wood Drives 
62. In the 1880s, the mining boom in Park City led to the depletion of local 
supplies of mining timbers and cordwood. After the success ofthe Upper 
Weber tie drives, news accounts predicted that the Park City mines would draw 
upon the ''vast the forests at the head of the Weber River" for their supply of 
mining timbers and cordwood "for years to come," and that these products 
would be floated down the Weber River to the boom at Wanship and then 
shipped by rail to Park City. (Exhibits 26, 27.) 
63. The first documented drive of mining timbers and cordwood started in the 
summer of 1888. The previous winter and spring George Kidder had cut 1000 
railroad cars worth of mining timbers at the headwaters of the Weber for the 
Ontario and Daly mines. (Exhibit 30.) 
64. According to a report from Peoa, dated July 26, 1888, Kidder's log drive was 
"tied up here owing to low water." (Exhibit 31.) 
65. There is no record of flows on the Upper Weber during 1888. However, low 
water and snowpack conditions were also reported on the Provo River that 
year, although a tie drive was successfully completed on that river in June. 
(Exhibits 117, 118.) 
66. The date of the report of Kidder's 1888 drive (July 26) indicates a possibility 
that the drive hung up because of a late start. (Dant testimony.) 
67. Kidder resumed the drive the following spring. According to a report from 
Peoa dated May 4, 1889, workers were driving logs "now on the river" to 
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Wanship, but "the water in the Weber is very low for this time of year, and it 
will be almost impossible to drive the logs that are now cut in the canyon.'~ 
(Exhibit 32.) 
68. The logs that Kidder put in the river in 1888 passed through the Landowner 
Properties either in 1888 in 18 89, depending on where in Peoa they were hung 
up. (Dant testimony; Rodgers testimony.) 
69. There is no precise record of flow conditions on the Upper Weber during the 
spring of I 889. However, an irrigation article reported that drought conditions 
existed on the Lower Weber in 1889. (Exhibit 80.) 
70. Drought conditions were also reported on the Provo River in 1889, where a tie 
drive failed that year. (Danttestimony.) 
71. The difficulties associated with the Kidder drive in 1889 were likely the result 
of extreme drought and were not reflective of normal conditions on the Upper 
Weber. (Dant testimony.) 
72. Normal river conditions returned in the spring of I 890. (Exhibits 80, 127.) 
73. Kidder succeeded that year in driving the rest of his mining timbers and 
cordwood to W anship, passing through the Landowner Properties. (Exhibit 
33.) 
74. The wood from Kidder's drive supplied the mines in Park City for at least two 
years. (Exhibits 37, 38.) 
75. It is likely that other drives of mining timber and cordwood occurred on the 
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the 1880s and 90s, although exact dates and circumstances of the drives are not 
specifically documented in the historical record. The likelihood of these 
additional drives is demonstrated by the following: 
a. News accounts in 1892, 1893 and 1894 continued to refer to large 
quantities of mining timber coming to Park City from mills on the 
Weber River above Wanship. (Exhibits 40-42.) 
b. Family histories from families living along the Weber in Wanship 
report "regular drives" or drives "each year" of mining timbers and 
cordwood during this period. (Exhibits 47-48.) 
iv. Log Drives to Saw Mills 
76. In the 1880s and 1890s, logs were floated down the Weber River from the 
upper Weber canyon to various sawmills located along the river to be 
processed into lumber. (Exhibits 43-44; Exhibit 46, p. 79.) 
77. At least one mill to which logs were floated was located north (downstream) of 
Wanship. (Exhibit 20, pp. 194-95.) Logs floated to this mill would have 
passed through the Landowner Properties. 
78. Several saw mills were located at Peoa in the early 1890s. (Exhibit 78, p. 201.) 
The historical record does not reveal whether these mills were located above or 
below the Landowner Properties. 
79. At these mills, logs were milled into lumber, shingles and other milled 
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80. The shortest route between Peoa and Park City during the early 1_890s was via 
the Browns Canyon Road, which crosses the River at the Landowner 
Properties, making them an ideal location for one or more of the Peoa saw 
mills. (Exhibit 121; Rodgers testimony.) 
81. Any log floats to the Browns Canyon Road could have passed through some of 
the Landowner Properties. At the very least, log floats to any saw mills located 
in Peoa would demonstrate the susceptibility of the Upper Weber to float logs 
where it passes through the Landowner Properties. 
d. Ultimate Findings Regarding Navigability in Fact 
v. Actual Use as a Highway of Commerce Over Which 
Trade and Travel Were Conducted 
82. Based on the fa,cts set forth above, from the late l 870s to 1896, the Upper 
Weber was used as a highway of commerce in transporting railroad ties for 
local and regional railroad lines. It is likely that most of this commerce passed 
through the Landowner Properties. 
83. During the 1880s and 1890s, the Upper Weber was used as a highway of 
commerce in transporting mining timbers and cordwood to the major mining 
center in Park City. It is likely that a large portion of this commerce passed 
through the Landowner Properties. 
84. During the same period, the Upper Weber served as a highway of commerce in 
transporting saw logs to various sawmills located on the river at Wanship and . 
above. Some of this commerce passed through the Landowner Properties. 
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likely to have occurred during the following years: 1877 (known), 1879 
(known), 1880 (known), 1881 (known), 1882 (known), 1883 (likely), 1888 or 
1889 (known), 1890 (known), and 1896 (likely). (Exhibit 64.) 
vi. Susceptibility of Use as a Highway of Commerce 
Over Which Trade and Travel May Have Been 
Conducted 
86. Apart from the difficulties associated with the Kidder drive(s) in 1888-89, 
there is no evidence suggesting that absence of documented drives on the 
Upper Weber during other years leading up to statehood was due to 
unfavorable river conditions. It is more probable than not that factors unrelated 
to river conditions account for the absence of documented drives during such 
years, including: 
a. Depletion of timber supplies in Upper Weber canyon (Dant 
testimony; Exhibit 21); 
b. Competition from timber supplies on other rivers, such as the 
Provo (Dant testimony); 
c. Financial crises affecting the Railroad industry and lumber 
markets, such as the Panic of 1893 and the bankruptcy of the 
Union Pacific (Dant testimony); 
d. Lack of news sources in the area (Dant testimony); and 
e. Increasing lack of newsworthiness of river drives over time 
(Exhibit 12, p. 8 I; Dant testimony.) 
87. The documented log and tie drives on the Upper Weber between 1877 and 
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I. 
1896, coupled with the lack of any evidence suggesting that the natural and 
ordinary condition of the Upper Weber at statehood differed materially from 
what it was leading up to statehood or from what it is today, establishes that the 
Upper Weber was susceptible of being used for log and tie drives under nonnal 
conditions throughout the statehood era, including in 1896. 
88. The documented drives on the Provo, Upper Bear and Blacks Fork during the 
statehood era further indicate that the Upper Weber was used for log and tie 
drives under normal conditions throughout the statehood era, including in 
1896. 
vii. Customary Modes of Trade and Travel 
89. The log and tie drives on the Upper Weber were conducted in the customary 
modes of trade and travel over water, as evidenced by the widespread use of 
seasonal log and tie drives on other rivers in the region. 
viii. Natural Condition 
90. The log and tie drives occurred on the Upper Weber in its natural condition. 
The only evidence of stream alterations to aid drives consists of occasionally 
building up banks to prevent logs from floating into low lying meadows, 
winging off side streams and channels, and/or digging out the riverbed to 
prevent log jams. (Exhibits 48, Exhibit 17, p. 1.) These alterations did not 
substantially alter the natural character of the stream channel. 
91. There is no evidence on the Upper Weber of splash dams or other techniques 
used to drive logs down small streams otherwise incapable of floating logs. 
24 of 26 
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(Dant testimony; Rodgers testimony.) 
ix. Ordinary Condition 
92. The log and tie drives on the Upper Weber were usefully and dependably 
performed during ordinary spring runoff conditions, and even though 
occasional droughts or other factors may have interfered with the progress of 
the drives. 
x. Useful Commerce 
93. The log and tie drives on the Upper Weber represented useful commerce and 
played a significant role in developing the railroad and mining industries in 
northern Utah and the surrounding region. 
94. The log and tie drives on the Upper Weber were useful in providing wage-
paying employment for the men of Wanship, Peoa, Oakley and other 
communities along the River. This work included not only the running of the 
river drives in the spring, but cutting and hauling ties and timbers in the Uinta 
Mountains throughout the fall and winter and preparing them for the spring 
drives. These activities added significant value to local economies. 
xi. Navigability in Fact 
95. Where it passes by and through the Landowner Properties, the Weber River 
was, at the time of statehood, used and susceptible of being used, in its natural 
and ordinary condition, as highway of commerce, over which trade and travel 
were conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over water. Thus, it 
is navigable in fact. 
.· .-·· ·_:] ..... . 
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III. Conclusions of Law: 
Based upon the preceding legal analysis and findings of fact, the Court enters the 
following conclusions of law. 
1. Under applicable federal law, a river that is navigable in fact is navigable in law. 
The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1871); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 
(1931). 
2. Based on the above findings of fact, the Weber River is navigable in law where it 
passes by and through the Landowner Properties. 
3. Because the Weber River is navigable in law where it passes through the 
Landowner Properties, the State of Utah holds sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber below 
the ordinary high water mark at the location of the Landowner Properties. 
4. Under Utah law, the Coalition's members and the general public are entitled to use 
the riverbed of the Weber River at the above locations for lawful recreational purposes. Utah 
Code §73-29-201(1). 
5. The Coalition is entitled to a declaratory judgment consistent with the foregoing. It 
is further entitled to an injunction requiring the Landowner Defendants to remove any no 
trespassing signs from their properties that that are inconsistent with the public's rights as stated 
above, and to take no further actions interfering with such public rights. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court directs counsel for Plaintiff to prepare a proposed 
form of Order and Final Judgment consistent with these findings and conclusions, and to file it 
with the Court after serving it on opposing counsel pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). 
SIGNED ABOVE PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIV. P. IO(i) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




JAMES FULLER PARK As Trustee of the 
Revocable Trust Of James Fuller Park; ORANGE 
STREET DEVELOP1\1ENT, A Utah limited 
partnership; WENDELL J. STE1\1BRIDGE and ILA 
D. STEMBRIDGE, as Trustees of the Wendell J. 
Stembridge Intervivos Revocable Trust dated the29th 
day ofNovember 1988; VERN G. STEMBRIDGE 
and DOROTHY l\IBCHAM STEMBRIDGE, as 
Trustees of The Vern G. Stembridge And Dorothy M. 
Stembridge Trust dated December 7, 1989; UTAH 
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES, an agency 
of the State of Utah; the UTAH DIVISION OF 
PARKS AND RECREATION, an agency of the State 
of Utah; and SHERIFF DAVID A. EDMUNDS, in 
his official capacity as Summit County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER AND FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 110500360 
Hon. Keith A. Kelly 
This matter came before the Court for trial on February 6, and February 9-11, 2015. 
W. Cullen Battle and Craig C. Coburn appeared as counsel for Plaintiff Utah Stream Access 
Coalition (the "Coalition.") Anthony W. Schofield and Peter C. Schofield appeared as counsel 
for Defendant Orange Street Development ("Orange Street"). Michael S. Johnson and Douglas 
J. Crapo appeared as counsel for the State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire & State Lands, 
having been substituted for the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources and the Utah Division of 
Parks and Recreation. Jared G. Parkinson, as counsel for Defendant James Fuller Park as 
Trustee of the Revocable Trust of James Fuller Park ("Park"), and Scott A. Dubois, as counsel 
1 
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for Defendants Wendell J. Stembridge and Ila D. Stembridge as trustees of the Wendell J. 
Stembridge Intervivos Revocable Trust dated the 29th day ofNovember 1988, and Vern G. 
Stembridge and Dorothy Mecham Stembridge, as trustees of the Vern G. Stembridge and 
Dorothy M. Stembridge Trust dated December 7, 1989 (collectively "Stembridge") were excused 
from appearing at trial by stipulation. Defendants Orange Street, Park and Stembridge will be 
referred to as the "Landowner Defendants." 
The properties of the Landowner Defendants referred to in this Order and Final Judgment 
(the "Properties") consist of the following: 
Summit County Parcel No. CD-33, owed by Defendant Park; 
Summit County Parcel No. CD-32, owned by Defendant Orange Street; and 
Summit County Parcel Nos. CD-161 and CD 99, owned by Defendants Stembridge. 
On April 10, 2015, the Court entered its Legal Analysis, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (the "Findings and Conclusions"), resolving all claims in favor of the 
Coalition. Based on the Findings and Conclusions, the Court now enters a Final Judgment in 
favor of the Coalition and against all remaining Defendants declaring that: 
May 19, 2015 05:58 PM 
1. the Weber River is navigable in fact and navigable in law under federal law 
where it passes through the Properties; 
2. the State of Utah holds sovereign land title to the bed of the Weber River below 
the ordinary high water mark at the location of the Properties; and 
3. the Coalition's members and the general public are entitled to use the streambed 
of the Weber River at the above locations for lawful recreational purposes. 
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but not materialiy different than current flows, (Findings~ 22), the current 
ordinary high water mark of the Weber River shall be used for determining the 
river bed title held by the State of Utah at statehood in 1896. 
The Court further enters a Final Judgment ordering Defendants Park and Orange Street to 
remove any no trespassing signs from their properties that that are inconsistent with the public's 
rights as stated above, and to take no further actions interfering with such public rights. 
Objections to this fonn of order have been considered, but are hereby overruled. 
Submitted by: 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Isl W. Cul1en Battle 
W. Cullen Battle 
END OF DOClThffiNT 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
Isl Craig C. Coburn 
Craig C. Coburn 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
3 
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I hereby certify that this AMENDED ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT was served 
via the Court's e-filing system or by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on this 14th day of 
May, 2015, upon the following:: 
Craig C. Coburn 
Richards Brandt Miller Nelson 
299 South Main Street, I 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
craig-coburn@rbmn.com 
Jared G. Parkinson 
623 East 100 South 




Kirton & McConkie 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
aschofiled@kmc]aw.com 
pschofield@kmcJaw.com 
Isl W. Cullen Battle 
May 19, 2015 05:58 PM 
4 
Scott DuBois 
Wrona Gordon & Dubois, PC 
1745 Sidewinder Drive 
Park City, UT 84060 
dubois@wgdlawfirm.com 
Michael S. Johnson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division of Forestry, Fire & State Lands 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
mikejohnson@utah.gov 
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Appendix/A· .. · 
IN TiiE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
FOR TIIE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS 
JANELLE M. McCORMACK, as Trustee of Case No. 09CV1654CC 





ST ATE OF OREGON, and ALL OTHER 
PERSONS OR PARTIES UNKNOWN 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT, TITLE, LIEN, OR 




DEC'7 . 2010 




This matter came before the Court for trial on October 12-15, 2010 and October 26~28, 
2010. Stephen Mountainspring and Jason Montgomery appeared as counsel.for plaintiffs. 
Matthew Donohue and Mark Schumock,Assistant Attorneys General, appeared as counsel for 
l7 Defendant State of Oregon. 
18 The court having heard argument and having reviewed the pleadings, evidence, and 
19 testimony, makes the following, 
20 Findings of Fact: 
21 1. The Court finds the expert testimony of defendant's expert witness Dr. Stephen 
22 Beckham to be persuasive on all issues to which he testified upon with the exception of his 
23 testimony as to the dates of operation on the Patterson Mill that operated near the confluence of 
24 Britt Creek and the North Um.pqua River. On this issue, the Court finds that the testimony of 
25 plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Kevin Hatfield to be persuasive; 
26 
Page 1 - GENERAL JUDGMENT 
MJD/cre/23 60245-v 1 
Department of Justice 
1162 Court Street NE 
Salem, OR 97301-4096 
(503) 947-4700 /Fu:.(503) 947-4792 
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2. The Court fmds the testimony of defendant's expert witness Dr. Bo Shelby to b~ 
2 persuasive; 
3 3. The Court finds the testimony of defendant's expert witness Dr. Peter Klingeman 
4 to be persuasive; 
5 4. The Court finds the testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness Dr. Kevin Hatfield to 
6 be persuasive on the issues of the dates of operation of the Patterson Mill near the confluence of 
7 Britt Creek and the North Umpqua River. Toe· Court also finds persuasive Dr. Hatfield's 
8 testimony that blasting of obstructions on the North Umpqua·River most likely occurred during 
9 the period of J 901-1903. The Court does not find Dr. Hatfield's testimony to be persuasive on 
l 0 any other issuest including but not limited to, the magnitude and effect of any blasting that may 
11 have occurred on the North Umpqua River during 1901-1903; 
12 5. The Court finds the testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness, David Leonard, to be 
13 persuasive. However, the Court finds that Mr. Leonard's testimony does not support plaintiffs' 
14 contention that blasting occurred between 1901-1903 in the Narrows section of the North 












6. Plaintiffs~ properties are located adjacent to each other at approximately river 
mile 34.5 of the North Umpqua River. Both properties are downstream of both the confluence of 
Rock Creek with the North Umpqua River and a section of the North Umpqua River known as 
the Narrows, which is located at approximately river mile 35; 
7. Prior to statehoodt the Umpqua/Calapooia and Molalla Indian tribes occupied the 
land surrounding the North Umpqua River. The Umpqua/Calapooia tribe occupied the land 
along the North Umpqua River from approximately river mile 30 to the confluence of the North 
Umpqua River as well as land along the Umpqua River. The Molalla tribe occupied the land 
along the North Umpqua River from approximately river mile 30 upstream to the river's 
headwaters. These tribes engaged in inter-tribal communication and mmiage. Both tribes 
utilized at least one salmon fishery locate~ upstreiim from plaintiffs' property at the Narrows; 
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8. The Umpqua/Calapooia tribes utilized "Klamath style" canoes on the North 
Umpqua River. This type of canoe was hewn from cedar logsand had a square bow and a square 
stem. This type of canoe was desjgned for use in rivers with rapid water and had a draft of 
between six to eight inches. The Umpqua/Calapooia tribes used these Klamath-style canoes to 
transport fish downstream from annual fishing expeditions at the Narrows to points on the river 
downstream of plaintiffs, properties; 
9. Pre-statehood arid post-statehood settlers on the North Umpqua River also owned 
and utilized Klamath-style canoes for trade and travel on the river; 
10. In 1855,-56, the Umpqua/Calapooiaand Molalla tribes entered into treaties with 
the United States. As a result of these treaties, the tribes were relocated from their-ancestral lands 
on the North UmpquaRiver to reservations near the Oregon Coast. At the time of statehood, few 
Indians remained along the North Umpqua River~ The majority of th~ Indians who did remain 
behind were considered to be ''fugitives" who continued toreside along the river and its 













11. From 1876-1878 a sawmill known as the Patterson Mill operated on the North 
Umpqua River at the confluence of Britt Creek and the North Umpqua River at approximately 
river mile 33, l. In 1878, this s·awmill was moved downriver to a point on the river at 
approximately river mile 28. There existed logging operations during this period of time that 
took place at approximately river mile 35.7, which is upstre.am of plaintiffs' properties, and 
involved transporting logs along a sl<ld road and placing them in the North Umpqua River. The 
logs were then floated down the North Umpqua River past plaintiffs' properties and were 
retrieved at either the Patterson sawmill at its: location in 1876-1878 or at its new location after 
1878; 
12. In 1871, cadastral surveyors conducted a partial survey of Township 26 South, 
Range 3 west, W .M.. This survey included surveying the section of the North I:Jmpqua River 
that passes by plaintiffs, properties. If cadastral surveyors believed a river to be navigable, they 
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were instructed to conduct a meander survey· of the river. The cadastral surveyors did not 
meander the section of the river passing plaintiffs' properties. However, the failure of the 
cadastral surveyors to meander this section of the river is not dispositive on the issue of 
navigability as it only represents the opinion of the surveyor(s); 
13. Between 1901 andl903, the Oregon Boom and TimberCompanyperf~rmed some 
improvements on the river that more likely than not involved some unknown amount of blasting 
on the river to remove obstructions. However, any blasting performed on the North Umpqua 
River during this time did not significantly alter the river's channel or flow characteristics, nor 
9 did it remove any significant obstructions preventing the river from being utilized for 
10 commercial purposes; 
11 14. On July I 0, 1903, the Douglas County Court awarded a franchise to the Oregon 
12 Boom and Timber Company to improve a section ofthe North Umpqua River from 
13 approximately river mile 52 to river mile 7 in order to float logs down this section of the river. 
14 In granting the franchise, the county court declared that this section of the North Umpqua River 
15 was, in fact, not navigable for commercial purposes. The Court finds that this statement was not 
16 made in the context of determining title ownership of the bed and banks of the North Umpqua 
17 River but was instead made in the context of establishing a public-private partnership to extract 
18 timber and transport it down the river for commercial use. The July 10, 1903 county court 
19 declaration is therefore not controlling for the purpose of determining navigabHity to determine 
20 title ownership. In addition, the Court finds that logs had been transported down the North 
Umpqua River prior to the county court's July 10, 1903 declaration; 21 
22 15. Several log drives·occUO'ed in 1908 and transported at least 164,000 board feet of 
23 logs from land upstream of plaintiffs' properties to the town ofWmchester, located below 
24 plaintiffs' properties; 
25 16. Based on an analysis of current and historic hydrology and precipitation data for 
26 the North Umpqua River and its basin, the Court finds that the ccnormal" mean annual flow of the 
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1 river in the vicinity of plaintiffs' properties is 2,260 cubic feet per second (cfs) with a variability 
2 in mean average flow rates ranging from 1060 cfs to 3)990 cfs. The Court finds that, while these 
3 flow rates were calculated from data acquired after statehood, they accurately reflect the 
4 condition of the river at the time of statehood given that that the river's flow rate in the vicinity 
5 of plaintiffs' properties' has not been considerably altered since statehood; 
6 17. Based on the above flow rates, the North Umpqua River that passes by plaintiffs' 
7 properties would have sufficient flow at the time of statehood to a1low a craft, such as a 
8 Klamath-style canoe., which has a six to eight inch draft requirement, to successfully navigate the 
9 river, 
10 18. Although it is likely that a person navigating the river in the vicinity of plaintiffs' 
11 properties at the time of statehood would have to portage a canoe around the Narrows, such a 
12 portage does not impact the river's ability to be used for commercial purposes; 
13 19. Currently, a variety of watercraft, such as kayaks, inflatable boats, and catarafts, 
14 are used on the North Umpqua River for recreational purposes. While the majority of 
15 recreational use on the river occurs either upstream of the plaintiffs' properties or downstream of 
16 the properties~ some recreational use does occur in front of and in the vicinity of plaintiffs' 
1 7 properties. In addition, current residents and tenants near plaintiffs' properties utilize canoes and 
18 rowboats to travel across the river. These watercraft have draft and channel requirements similar 
19 to those of the Klamath-style canoes historically used by Indians.and settlers on the river; 
20 20. Sometime after 1980, a commercial outfitter provided guided 1rips of the North 
21 Umpqua River for approximately 10 years. These guided trips started at river mile 34, but the 
22 river's overall flow and channel characteristics between river mile34 and the base of the 
23 Narrows at approximately river mile 34. 7 are such that guided river trips could have been started 
24 at the base of The Narrows, were there adequate public river access at that location to support 
25 guided river trips~ 
26 
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1 21. The Court finds that the section of the North Umpqua River at issue in this case is 
2 navigable in fact because it was actually used prior to statehood by Indian tribes to transport a· 
3 commodity, namely fish, from an annual salmon fishery above plaintiffs' properties to points on 
4 the river below plaintiffs' properties; 
5 22. The Court finds that the section of the river at issue in this case is navigable in 
6 fact because it was susceptible of being used at the time of statehood as a highway of commerce 
7 given the demonstrated post-statehood use of the river for the transportation oflogs and for 
8 commercial guided recreational use and given that the channel and flow characteristics of the 
9 river have not been ~ignificantly modified since statehood. 
10 Conclusions of Law: 
11 1. Northwest Steelheaders Association, Inc. v. Simante/, 199 Or App 471 (2005) 
12 articulates the current test that the Court must apply to determine whether the section of the 
13 North Umpqua River flowing past plaintiffs' properties is navigable for the purpose of 
14 establishing title ownership; 
15 2. Under the test in Northwest Stee/headers Association, Inc. v. Slmante/, a river is 
16 navigable if, at the time of statehood, it was used, or was susceptible of being used in its ordinary 
17 and natural condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade·and travel is .or may be 
18 conducted in the customary modes oftrade and travel on water. Under this test, a·river may be 
19 determined to be navigable if it was either actually used prior to statehood as a highway for 
20 commerce or if, at the time of statehood, it was susceptible of being used in its ordinary 
21 condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade.and travel is or may be cond·ucted in the 
22 customary modes of trade an_d travel on water; 
23 3. Susceptibility can be demonstrated through evidence of post-stat~hood use of the 
24 riverif it can be demonstrated that the river, in its ordinary and natural condition at the time of 
25 statehood, could have supported those uses and so long as those post-statehood uses can be 
26 
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1 conducted utilizing modes of travel that are similar to those customarily :used at the time of 
2 statehood; 
3 4. Based on the above .findings of fact, the section of the North Umpqua River along 




5. The state of Oregon is the title owner of the bed and banks of the North Umpqua 
River along plaintiffs' properties as those properties are described in the metes and bounds 
description attached to plaintiffs' Amended Complaint as Exhibits A and B. The Court's 
8 navigability and ownership determinations are limited only to this section of the North Umpqua 
9 River. 
10 Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ADnJDGED that: 
11 The State of Oregon owns all rights, title and interest in and to the lands located below 
12 the Jine of ordinary high water (as defined in ORS 274.005) along the section of the North 
13 Umpqua River passing through or by the property identified in Exhibits A and B attached to this 
14 Judgment and incorporated herein. 













Matthew Donohue #022955 
Assistant Attorney General 
Oregon Department of Justice 
H GARRISON 
Circuit Court Judge 
Randolph Lee Ga;rison 
Of Attorneys for Defendant State of Oregon 
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EXIDBITA 
The following described property in Sections 2 and 11, Township 26 South. Range J West 
of the Willamette Meridian, Douglas County, Oregon. 
Beghmlng at a pofnt on the old-fence-line fronrwhich the cor1·ected qoarter .. coiner between 
Sections 2 and 11 as established and recorded October 1974 ·bears South 68° 18" ·13" East 295. 7 
feet; thence along the old fenpe line North 89° 14' 25'' East 148.1 feet. North 82° 56t 47" East 
182.1 feet, and South 8° 24' 44" -East 28.7 feet; thence South 0° 41' East 1468,58 feet along the 
West line of the Mayme and David L. Cota property described in instrument 71-6907, deed records 
of Douglas County, Oregon to a steel axle; thence South O«> 41' East 342.85 feet along said West 
line to a 1" iron rod on the Northerly right-of-way of the North Umpqua Highway; thence South 0° 
41' East 344.16 feet across said right-of-way and along the West line of the Joe E. Sendelbach 
property described in instrument 73-7693 and the Forrest C. Lossee property described in 
instrument 75w 12214, deed records of Douglas County, Oregon, to a point on the Northel'ly bank of 
the North Umpqua River; thence South 0° 41' East 93.41 feet to the centerline of the North 
Umpqua River; thence downstream along said centerline to a point which bears South 0° 49' East 
2447 feet from the point of beginning; thence North 0° 49• West 2447 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Excepting.therefrom that property tying within the right of way of the North Umpqua 
Highway. 










":.. ODO5-90 , 
I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 





.. ' . . . . · ... ·.-:.·. ' , .. . . . . . . . .. 
·-·· .: .. _-' ...... ._. 
EXHIBITB 
The following described property in Sections 2 and 11. Township 26 South, Range 3 West 
of the Willamette Meridian, Douglas County, Oregon. 
Beginning at a point on the,old fence line from which the corrected quat1er-corner between 
Sections 2 and 11 as established and recorded October 1974 bears South 68° Is• 13° East 295.7 
feet; thence along the old fence line South 89° 14' 25° West 115.1 feet, South 88° 52' 21" West 
125.0 feet, and North 89° 15' 46"West 86.3 feet to the Northwest fence corner; thence continuing 
alo~g the old fence line South 0° 34' 40" East 1008.5 feet and South 0° 57' East 591.7 feet to a 
Vi-inch iron pipe; thence South 0° 48' East ll 30 feet, more or less, along the East line of North 
Umpqua Homes and the East line of that tract:de.scdbed in•-volwn~ C}.3.~ pages.')32-333 of the deed 
records of Douglas County, Oregon~ to the East;.West centerline.of Sec.tion~ I I Lci1ence· East 480 
feet, more or less, along said centerline to the·eenterqµ~~r~qo.inet of Section lJ; thenceNorth2° 
57, East to the centerline of thv North Umpqua.'River. thence downstream aloi1g th~ centerline of 
said river to a point which bears South 0° 49., East 2447 feet from the point of beginning; ·thence 
North 0° 49' West 2447 feet to the point of beginning . 
. 
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IN THE-UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT oF· OREGON 
STATE OF OREGON, acting by ) 
and thr'ough the Di vision of ) 
State Lands and its director, ) 
GARY GUSTAFSON, ) ) .. 




TIDEWATER CONTRACTOR, INC., ) 
JESS W. FITZHUGH; FITZHUGH, ) 
BALDWIN AND SALISBURY, an ) 
Oregqn partnership; DAVID ) 
BALDWIN; STEVEN SALISBURY; ) 
THEODORE L .. FREEMAN; DORIS ) 
FREEMA~; RIVER BEND ) 
CORPORATION; FRANCIS A. ) 
ARRELL; MAXINE R. ARRELL; ) 
F AND N ARRELL PARTNERSHIP; ) 
KEITH SMITH and VONNA E. ) 
SMITH, individually and as ) 
trustees of the Smith Family ) 
Trust; FERRY CREEK ROCK AND ) 
CONCRETE, ING. , JOHN K. ) 
CURRY; PATRICIA CURRY; ) 
STEEVENS BROS. , INC-. ; ) 
·MICHAEL B. STEEVENS; VELTA .M. ) 
MILLER-STEEVENS; ROBERT B. ) 




1 - ORDER 
Civil No. 93-6017-HO 
ORDER 
RECEIVED 
. AUG 1 2 f99d 
DIVISION OF SlATE I.ANOS 
,. 
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Plaintiff state of Oregon ~iled this suit in equity to 
quiet title and for ejectment under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
Plaintiff alleges that it owns the bed and banks, below the 
ordinary line of high water, .of portions of the Chetco River 
in Curry county, Oregon. Defendants are individuals. and 
corporations involved in the removal of gravel and river rock 
from alluvial deposits in and on the banks ~f the river. 1 
I. Navigabiiity: 
At the time the state of Oregon was admitted to the union 
of the United States of America on February 14, 1859, it 
became the title owner of all lands subject to tidal influence 
and all submerged and submersible lands below the line of 
ordinary high· water of all navigable rivers within its 
boundaries. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 {1934). 
Plaintiff ~lleges that the Chetco River is subject to 
tidal influence up.to approximately J 1/2 miles from its mouth 
at the Pacific Ocean and is, and was at toe time pf statehood 
in 1859, navigable at each of the locations at which 
defendants claim title to the river bed and banks. 2 
Defendants deny that the Chetco River is navigable and assert 
1 This case was consolidated with an action to quiet title and 
injunctive relief filed by defendants Tidewater Contractor, Inc., 
Fitzhugh, Salisbury, and Baldwin in ~he circuit court for the .state 
of Oregon for Curry County, case .no. 92CV 024, and removed to this 
court and designated as civil no4 93-6041-TC. 
2 Although the Chetco River is 58 •miles long, the _disputed 
ownership in this case involves only lands between river miles one 
and eleven. It is not disputed that the Chetco River is navigable 
from its mouth up to just above "Snug Harbor" at river miles 1.3 -
1.5. See Defendant Tidewater's Response (#75), p. 10. 
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various equitable defenses -to plaintiff's claim of title and 
ownership. 
Rivers are deemed na:vigable in law which are navigable in 
fact.- The Daniel Ball. 77 U.S. 557 (1870)_. Whether waters 
within a state are navigable for purposes 6f determining state 
ownership is a federal question, State of Oregon v. 
Riverfront Protection·Association, 672 F.2d 792, 794 (9th cir. 
19~2), to be decided by the court. Order (#106), p. 4. 
Regardless of the actual use of a waterway.at the time of 
statehood, it is deemed navigable if it was susceptible of use 
as a highway of commerce.. u.s, v. Utah, 283 u.·s. 64 (1931); 
state of Alaska·v. Ahtna, 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989). 
~laintiff moved. "to establish.the navigability status of 
the Chetco River, Oregon for . title purposes." Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (#54), p. 2. By order (#106), the 
court found: 
Rivers are navigable if "they are used, or are 
susceptible of being u·sed, in their ordinary 
condition,· as highways f.or commerce, over which 
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the 
customary modes of trade and travel on water. " The 
Dan1el Ball, supra; State of Alaska v. Ahtna. Inc.,· 
891 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1989). fransportation 
of people or goods is inclu~ed within this 
standard. State of Alaska v. United States, .754 
F.2d 851 854 (9th Cir. 1985); ~ also State of 
Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d at 1405 ..... It 
is not neces.sary that commerce in fact · be 
conducted, rather "susceptibility to useful 
commerce" is the crucial factor. State of.Alaska 
v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d at 1404 n. 3 •••. A use 
which relates to today• s recreation industry may 
also be considered a commercial use. State of. 
Oregon v. Ahtna. · Inc., 891 F. 2d at 1405 (guided 
fishing an~ sightseeing trips covered) ••• 
However, the conditions of the river and 
3 - ORDER 
,~ .• 000595 
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capabilities of the watercraft_ used at the time of 
statehood and post-statehood must be sufficiently 
similar. . • • · 
In evaluating river use evidence, the court is to 
consider whether navigability is confined to 
exceptional conditions or short pe.riods ·of 
temporary high water. City of Centralia. Wash. v. 
F.E.R.C., 851 F.2d 278, '·2s1 (9th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. state of Utah, 283 U.S •. 64, 87 (1931) 
(~iver navigable where susceptible of use _as 
highway of commerce for nine months of year). 
However, use of the river · need not be without 
difficulty~ extensive, or long and -continuous. 
-City of Centralia. Wash. v. F.E.R.C., 851 F.2d at 
281. 
order (#106), pp. 5 - 7. 
An evidentiary hearing regarding the navigability of the 
Chetco. River was . held on March 15 ~ 18 and 29, 1994. 
Plaintiff presented the following types of evidence of the 
navigability: 
1) historical evidence of uses by native Americans 
before and at the time Oregon became a state on February 14, 
1859; 
2) evidence of post-st~tehood uses of the river as a 
11 highway of commerce"; 
3) hydrological data regarding the susceptibility of 
the river .to navigat~on by .various types of watercraft; and 
4) current uses of the river which could have occurred 
pri"or to or at the time of statehood. 
After considering the testimony of the witnesses, the 
exhibits and the arguments of the attorneys, I find as 
follows. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 .. The current condition of the Chetco River is 
substantially the same as in 1859, except for changes near its 
mouth caused by the installation of jetties. The Chetco River 
is characterized . by pools of varying depths separated by 
. . 
shallow riffles. There are no true rapids .. and no falls in the 
section of river at issue in this case. There are _areas of 
relatively rapid water.· There is a distinct seasonal pattern 
of runoff in the_Chetco River basin with large flows typically 
occu~ring between November and March and smaller fiows 
typically occurring between July and September. The annual 
stream flow amounts and seasonal patterns of flow in the 
Chetco River have not changed to a~y appreciable extent 
between 1859 and the present and, to the extent that 
navigability depends upon stream flow amounts and seasonal 
flow variations duri-ng the year, the river is -presently 
essentially the same as it was at the time of statehood. 
2. Prior to and at the time the state of .Oregon was 
admitted to the union of the United States of America, 
southwestern Oregon was populated in part by a group of native 
Americans known as coastal Athapascans. 3 Coastal Athapascans 
in southwestern Oregon and northern California had social 
characteristics and cultural attributes known to 
anthropologists as the "Lower Klamath Sub-culture." 
3 
"Athapascan" is a group of related North American Indian 
languages includin·g Navaho, . Apache, and languages of Alaska, 
northwestern ·canada, and coastal oregon·and California. 
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3. Members of the Lower Klamath Sub-culture co.nstructed 
and used dugout canoes on ~he rivers in the areas where they 
lived. The type of canoe commonly associated with tribes of· 
the Lower Klamath Sub-culture· is the "Klamath shovel-nose" 
canoe, notabl~ for its blunt nose, shallow draft, and "heart. 11 
.4. Prior to 1~59, settlements of coastal Athapascans 
known as Che·tco Indians · were located at several locations 
along the banks of the Chetco River from its· mouth at the 
Pacific ocean up to approximately ·riv~r mile (RM) 14. 
Historians have documented nine perm~nent site encampments and 
estimate a population· ·of approximately 250 Chetco Indians 
1 i ving along the banks·. of the Chetco in the 18 50s. 4 Chetco 
India~s built and used'. canoes for tra~sportation on the river, 
consistent with the design characteristics of the Klamath 
shovel-nose canoe. The "Hiouchi" canoe5 is an accurate 
depiction of the Klamath shovel-nose. _canoe used by nat~ve 
Americans on the Chetco River prior to 1859. The "Mattz"6 and 
4 Historical accounts collected from et:hnog·raphic informants 
in 1942 also locate Chetco Indian villages .beyond the portion of 
the river at issue in this lawsuit, up to approximately RM 22 at a 
place which later came to be known as "Toleman•s Ranch." 
5 The Hiouchi .canoe (,egg Plaintiff's Exhibit 55, p. J) is 
located at the Redwoods Visitors Center in the Jedfdiah Smith state 
Park, curry.county, Oregon. 
6 owned by Ray Mattz, a Chetco descendant living in Curry. 
County, Oregon. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 55, p. 4. Mr. Mattz• 
canoe was used by defendants• expert Gerald LaRue and attorney Mr. 
Nokes to attempt to ascend a portion of the Chetco River to 
determine the river's navigability. 
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"Lopez"' canoes are other examples of Klamath shovel-nose 
canoes. 
5. Chetco Indians used Klamath shovel-nose canoes as a 
means of transportation and to transport items of value to 
their culture,. including- food, on the Chetco River as it 
existed in its ordinary and natural condition prior . to 
February 14, 1859. 
6. Chetco India·ns conducted a "seasonal round" which 
consisted of fishing for anadramous fish in.the river during 
the spring, fishing for smelt and. shellfish in the coastal 
areas in.the summer, moving up river to catch eels, harvest 
berries and acorns, and hunt in the fall, and returning to 
·their village~·along the.lower river during the-winter months. 
7. Chetco Indians used shovel-nose canoes as pa~t __ of. 
engaging in the seasonal round on the Chetco River from its 
mouth to above~ 11. 
8. In 1942, John P. Harrington, an e~hnographer8 for 
the Srnithsonia~ Institution, interviewed many inhabitant 
"informants" of the Chetco River area, including elderly 
Chetco survivors.q A Chetco woman named Jennie Scott reported 
to Harrington that she traveled up the Chetco River with her 
7 The Lopez canoe(~, Plaintiff's Exhibit 55, p. 2) belongs 
to Mr. Sam Lopez, a Tolowa Indian living near Crescent city, 
California. 
1 Plaintiff's· expert witness, Dr. Stephen D. Beckham, defined 
11 ethnohistory" as a "marriage" of the disciplines of anthropology 
and history. · . 
9 Harrington's "Field·Notes" number over 29,000 pages. 
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family in a canoe to harvest acorns when she was a child. 
9. Documented canoe use by other tribe$ within the 
·Lower Klamath Sub-culture on nearby rivers also supports the 
conclusion that Chetco Indians used canoes for transportation 
on the Chetco River and partially relied ·on canoes for their 
~ubsi:sten(?e. 
10. Native American use of canoes on the Chetco·River 
was observed and documented by officials of the United States 
government prior to February 14, 18~9. 
11. Lieutenant Edward o.c. -Ord, a United States Army 
officer during the "Indian Wars" of. the 1850s, and Captain 
William Tichenor, an independent contractor engaged by the 
United States government to capture native Americans for 
re~ocation to the Siletz Reservation, each describe~ in their 
diary·notes the use of canoes by.Indians on the Chetco River. 
12. Pursuant to an unratified treaty· dated Au9ust 30, 
1855, Chetco Indians requested to take their canoes when they 
were 11 relocated 11 to the Siletz reservation. This indicates 
the importance of the canoes to the Chetco Indians. 
13. Thomas .van Pelt, one of the first Euroamerican 
settlers near the mouth of th·e Chetco River., described the 
Chetco Indians as "expert canoe men on both.river an~ ocean." 
See Affidavit of Dr. Stephen Beckham (#55), Attachment B, p. 
29. 
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14. Christian Tuttle10 , a donation land claimant in 
1953, brought a whaleb~at to the Chetco River which was used 
for transportation on the river. Christian Tuttle's whaleboat 
was mentioned in Van Pelt's writings and also in Lt. Ord's 
accounts about pursuing Indians llp the Chetco River. 
15. From the late 1870s to the early 1900s, small 
commercial sawmills operated at different· times and at 
different locations _along the Chetco River from its mouth to 
approximately RM 14_ and, at high flows, the river was used to 
transport logs on occasio~. . · 
16. The Chetco River was occasionally·used to transport 
·myrtlewood and redwood from the late 1880s to the early 1900s. 
In 1893, loggers floated a · raft of redwood logs down the 
Chetco River. 
17. Tan bark was transporte_~ on flat-bottomed boats 
approximately eight miles down the Chetco River in 1902. 
18. An .Oregonian newspaper account in 1902 reported that 
Mr. Silas Moore ascended the Chetco in a watercraft to 
approximately.RM 14. 
19. Lieutenant Shunk _of the Army corp of Engineers 
reported in 1875 that it would be possible for a "small 
steamer" to ascend the Chetco Ri ve-r for 15 to 18 mi·les during 
six months of the year. 
10 Belying his given name, Christian Tuttle was a murderer who 
was referred to in a November 19, 1854 report by Indian Agent Ben 
Wright as "certainly the meanest man in existence." See, 
Plaintiff's-Exhibit 47, p. 1. 
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20. When the court of Indian Claims considered the 
clai1ns of the Chetco Tribe against ·the United states 
government .in 1950, it concluded ·the- Chetco River had been 
11 used for transportation an~ for moving logs from the timbered 
areas to sawmills near the coast .. tt Alcea Band of Tilamooks, 
et al., 87 F.Supp. 938, ~43 (1aso). 
21. Cadastral surveys conducted between 1859 and 1881 
portray ·the physical dimensions of the Chetco River ·from RM o 
to RM 11 as it existed in its ord_inary and natural condition 
at the time • of statehoo<:}. A· survey conducted by Dennis 
Sartwell in 1875 indicates that the channel width of the 
. . 
Chetco River ranged from about 132·feet at approximately RM 
7.5 to approximately 806 feet at RM 1.25. 
22. Shifting of the channel of the Chet·co River is 
minimal. because of the limited lateral space available in 
which a shift of channel position could occur •. The channel of 
the river is relatively stable and in a similar condition to 
the time of statehood. However, gravel extraction activities 
have somewhat reduced gravel bar height in the lower river 
compared to natural conditions, which allows the river to 
spread in width as water levels increase, thereby ~ecreasing 
natural scouring effects. This tends to generally "flatten" 
the river channel, increasing the number of riffles and 
decreasing the depth of the pools, causing a reduction in the 
overall water depth at any given rate of flow. The e.ffect of 
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somewhat more difficult·compared to the undisturbed condition 
of the river in the past. 
23. The portion of -the river below "Social Security Bar" 
(RM 3. 5) has changed as a result of the construction of 
jett_ies in 1957 • 11 
24. The channel of the Chetco River is relatively open 
and continuous from RM· 18 to the mouth of the river. There 
are no abrupt breaks in river profile-or tight constrictions 
that inhibit pa~sage of watercraft such as· northwest style 
driftboats or. canoes, beyond imped~~ents posed by riffles 
occurring at low water flow conditions. 
· 25. Low flow conditions expose· riffles in the_ Chetco 
River seasona Uy app;raxim.ately between July and September of 
each year. ·ouring times of low flow, riffles in the main 
channel of the river occur at intervals averaging 
approximately one mile over the lower fifteen miles of the. 
river, and pose the greatest impediment to navigation. Water 
depth at riffles seasonally becomes shall~w enough that 
passage in driftboats and canoes is impeded, but not 
precluded, although boaters must pull and/or push their craft 
at some locations~ 
'26. During periods of high flow, the Chetco River is 
characterized by wide open, unimpeded channels, absent the 
· riffles which are present during low flow periods. Flows that 
11 The portion of the Chetco River below RM 3. 5 is also 
subject to tidal influence. 
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prevail in the Chetco River during more than half o~ each year 
provide adequate depths arid widths for unimpeded, free passage 
~frigid manpowered watercraft such as the northwest style 
driftboat or the ~lamath shovel-nose·canoe between RM 11 and 
the mouth of the river. 
27. Beginning at least as early as 1937, professional 
fishing ·guides led fishing trips on the_ Chetco River from 
approximately RM 20 to the mouth of the river at Brookings. 
28. · The Chetco River .is currently regularly descended 
from RM 24 to its mouth in northwest style driftboats. These 
boats are used by individuals for recreational fishing 
purposes and for commercial purposes by professional river 
guides. 
2 9. The United· States Forest Service presen:t_ly limits to 
40 the number of commercial. guides licensed to take parties 
·fishing on the federally designated wild and ·scenic portion of 
the Chetco· River above RM 11. 12 Professional fishing guides 
qperating on the Chetco report average 34 guided fishing trips 
per year and presently charge approx~mately $100 per day per 
person for these trips. 
30. Northwest driftboats presently used on the Chetco 
River carrying two to three people and their fishing gear 
require approximately four to six inches of water to float, 
12 Prior to the imposition of limits on the number of 
commercial guides, an average of 75 commercial guides were licensed 
by the United states Forest Service to conduct guided fishing trips 
on the restricted portion of the river.· 
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can pass through a channel of water six feet wide if the boat 
is aligned parallel with the channel, and require a channel of 
twenty feet wide to drift sideways. The presence of shallow 
riffles and exposed cobbl~ impeC:ies, but does not prevent, 
nav;lgation ·of the Chetco River by northwest driftboats or 
watercraft with similar ·draft. 
31. A Klamath shovel-nose canoe requires· between six and 
eight inches of water to float freely, can pass through . a 
channel four feet wid.e if aligned with the course of the 
channel or a channel twenty feet wide if not aligned with the 
channel. The presence ·of shallow rif~les and exposed cobble 
will impede, but does not prevent, navigation of the Chetco 
River by shovel-nose canoe. 
32. Al though there are differences between the northwest 
driftboat presently used on the Chetco River and the Klamath 
shovel-nose canoe used on the river by native Americans prior 
to statehood, the width and depth qf water- required to float 
either.type ·of watercraft is similar. 
33. Northwest driftbo~ts presently Used on the Chetco 
River for-fishing could have been used for the same purpose in 
1859. 
3 4 • Hi ts, bumps, and hangups on · rocks and cobbles in 
shallow riffles present during periods of low water· do not 
preclude navigation of the Chetco River by either typi:cal 
northwest driftboats or by Klamath shovel-nose canoes. 
35. Northwest driftboats and. Klamath shovel-nose canoes 
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can be navigated up the Chetco River to RM 11 by paddling, 
poling, and/or pulling the watercraft. 
3 6 • The Chetco River between RM 11 and RM 3 • 5 is 
routinely used by recreational boaters, canoeists, and rafters 
during low flow summer months. 
37. The portion of the Chetco River at issue.in this 
lawsui~ is navigable by watercraft- during most moriths of most 
YE:ars and al lows watercraft pass~ge during some months of 
every year. 
38. The portio~ of the Chetco. ~iver at issue in this 
case has been navigated from aboriginal times to the-present. 
The use of canoes,~ whaleboat, flat bottom boats, small log 
rafts, and recreational fishing boats on the river are 
documented by historical and ethnohistorical sources. 
39. Va~ious types of watercraft have navigated the 
Chetco River for recreation, transportation, and commercial 
purposes. 
4 o. The Chetco Riv.er has served as an a~tery of· commerce 
in southwestern Oregon since before statehood in 1859. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Chetco River.was navigable and susceptible to 
navigation for purposes of trade and travel constituting 
commercial activity in its ordinary and natural condition as 
it existed in 1859 at the time Oregon was admitted to 
statehood. 
2. current uses of the Chetco River constitute 
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commercial activity which could have been conducted on the 
river in its ordinary and natural condition as it existed in 
1859 at the time Oregon was admitted.to statehood •. 
3. · At·the time the state of Oregon was admitted to the 
union of _the United States of America on February 14, 1859, 
it became title owner of the bed and banks, below the ordinary 
line of high water, of the Chetco River, up to at least RM 11. 
Plaintiff's motion for partia~ summary judgment (#54) to 
estab~ish the navigability of the Chetco River for title 
purposes is allowed. 
II. Equitable defenses: 
Def end ants' answers raise the equitable def ens es of 
adverse possession, laches, and estoppel. 13 Plaintiff moves 
to strike ( #41) and for partial summary judgment ori the . 
pleadings (#38) as to these defenses. The court def erred 
ruling on these matters. pending the navigapility determination 
by denying the motions (#38, #41) without prejudice. See 
Minute Order (#98) entere<:i August 4, 1993. 14 
13 1. Defendant River Bend's Answer (#33): first affirmative 
.defense is laches; second affirmative defense is estoppel. 
2. Defendant Allsup•s Amended Answer (#58): third 
affirmative defense is adverse possession; fourth affirmative 
defense is estoppel. 
3. Defendants Freeman, et al. Second Amended Answer 
(#140): fourth affirmative defense is laches; sixth affirmative 
defense is adverse possession; eighth affirmative defense is 
equitable estoppel. · ' 
4. Defendants Tidewater, et al. ·Answer (#68): second and 
third affirmative def ens es are estoppel; fifth·· defense is laches •. 
14 Defendants Freeman, et al. motion to dismiss and defendant 
River Bend' s motion to dismiss (#85) were also denied without 
prejudice pending che_ court's navigability determination. ~, 
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I construe plaintiff's May 4, 1994 letter as a request to 
reinstate the motiqns (#JB, #41)", to the extent it requests a 
ruling on defendants' equitable defenses. For the reasons set 
forth.below, I find that the equitable defenses of adverse 
possession, laches, and estoppel are not available to 
defendants u·nder the circumstances of this case and that 
plaintiff is entitled·to judgment as a matter.of law as to the 
equitable defenses asserted by defendants. 
1. s_tate title to submerged lands: 
The title to lands underlying navigable waters -in the 
state of Oregon•is not subject to acquisition through adverse 
possession or !aches ~ecause such lands are acquired by·the 
state in its sovereign ·capacity as :tru_stee for public use. 
Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co. v. state Land Board, 250 or. 
319, 336, 39 P.2d 575 (1968); Gatt v. Hurlburt, 131 Or. 554,· 
Order· (#98). To the extent defendants rely on those motions and 
the contention that the court lacks jurisdiction based. on the "well 
pleaded .complaint rule," I find as follows: 
The_ "well plead~d complaint rule" provides that where a 
plaintiff seeks relief under state law, such as in an action to 
quiet title, jurisdiction based on the· existence of a federal 
question requires that the plaintiff's entitlement to relief 
"necessarily turn[s] on the construction of federal law"· or depends 
on the resolution _of a substantial federal -issue. Yokens v. 
Mafnas, 973 F.2d 803, 807 (9th cir. 1992), citing Franchise Tax Bd. 
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Tru~t, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983). 
In this case, plaintiff's claim of title rests sq~arely on 
a determination of navigability, which is a federal question. u. s. 
v. Oregon, 295 1, 14 (1935); state of Oregon y. Riverfront 
P_rotection Ass' n., 672 F. 2d 792 (9t~ Cir. 1982) • 
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2. state t.i tle to .submersible lands: 
Based on the common law in effect when . the state of 
Oregon was admitted to the union, the state retains title to 
its navigable waters to the high water mark. Improvements 
such as w~arva..s do not crea~e "any right in the proprietor of 
the upland" unless and until the state specifically authorizes 
such a right •. Shivety v. ·Bowlby._ 152 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1894). 
_Although Shively concerned title to _lands lying between high 
and low water marks that were subject to. tidal influence, 
there is no distinction between tidal navigable water. and 
,. 
lands that fall between the high and low water marks along 
non-tidal navigab~e waterways. Id., at·p. a. 
. . 
The state's right in submersible lands is supreme and 
subject only to the paramount rights of ·navigation and 
commerce. Therefore, the state has no authority to dispose of 
submersible. lands in such· a manner as would interfere with 
these public rights. Corvallis Sand and Gravel v. State Land 
Board, supra, 250 Or. at 334. 
-Defendants contend that because the state may designate 
proprietary uses for submersible lands, such lands are not 
held in the state's sovereign capacity. However,_ the state• s 
authority to permit proprietary uses of submersible lands 
is The ratio·nale for these ·hoidings applies equally to a claim 
that estoppel may be employed as a defense against the state• s 
action for ejectment and to quiet title. See also, -State Land 
Board v. Lee, Bl or. 431, 434, • 165 P. 372 (1917). 
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does not diminish its responsibility to manage and control 
navigable waters ~or public use. For example, in An Act to 
Provide for the Sale of Tide and overflowed Lands on the Sea 
Shore and Coast, 16 the Oregon legislature found that it was in 
the public interest to ~llow private owners at their own 
expense to make "improvements and expenditures that will stay 
(tidal] encroachments" which interfere with naviga~ion. 
Accordingly, the state allowed owners to purchase tideland 
tha-t fronted their properties from the state. The state-
reserved. to itself the right to regulate "the building of 
wharves or other improvements in any bay or inlet .. • • n17 
Therefore, the state's _action· in allowing for private 
assumption of the costs of improvements did not evidence an 
intent to relinqui'sh control of the property for public uses. 
Provision has also been made for the sale of beds of 
navigable rivers which carry an inalienable public trust. 
See, Corvallis, supra at 337, -citing O.R.S. §§ 274.005(5), 
274.915. Accordingly, the state 1 s ability to alienate 
submersible land does not defeat its sovereign authority over 
the navigable water above such land. Therefore, irrespective 
of ·title, submersible lands are subject to the state's 
sovereign control and are to that extent public lands~ 
Equitable defenses are not available against claims to 
16 Statute of Oregon of October 28., • 1872, Laws of 1872, p. 
129, cited in Shively at p. 3. 
11 Id. 
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public· lands: 
The passage of an immunity statute, now O.R.S. 12.2so,n 
in 1903, rendered the defense of adverse possession 
inapplicable against the state. The Oregon and United States 
supreme court cases relied. upon by defendants predate -the 
passage of this statute. 
As noted in state Land Board v. Lee, 84 or. 431, 434, 165 
P. ·372 (1917), "as a matter of public policy [immunity from 
limitation~) is necessary to preserve ~ublic rights, revenues 
and property from injury and loss by the negligence of public 
officers." The sa~e rationale applies to the ·rule regarding 
laches, Corvallis, supra, 250 or. at 332, and estoppel. See 
Rohde v·. State Industrial Accident Commission, 108 Or. 420, 
438-39, 217 P. 627 (1932). 
Public·policy, to prevent loss to the state through 
the negligence of public officers, forbids the 
·application of the doctrine of estoppel to the 
state. On· the same ground that the 
government is excused from the consequences of 
laches, it should not be affected by the negligence 
or even willfulness of any one of its officers. 
Based on all of the foregoing, I find that the state 
acquired and holds title to the lands underlying its navigable 
waters and .the submersible lands adjacent ·thereto in its 
sovereign capacity on behalf of the public. Therefore, the 
equitable defenses asserted by defendants are unavailable 
18 Unless otherwise made applicable thereto, the limitations 
prescribed in.this chapter shall not apply to actions brought in 
the name of.the state, or any county, or other public corporation 
therein, or for its benefit. 
19 - ORDER 
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against plaintiff's.claim of title and plaintiff is entitled 
to judgment as a matter-of law as to defendants• affirmative 
defenses of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel. 
DATED this /C)-/. day of August, 1994. 
.··\ 
1.', ; . 
· .. :,i; "··--- ·- : . I• . ; 
t: ·· ... : 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 
STATE OF NEVADA, l Case No. 8799 
Appellant, 
v. l 






THE CARSON RIVER WAS, lN FACT, A 
NAVIGABLE STREAM UPON NEVADA'S 
ADMISSION TO STATEHOOD, AND THERE-
FORE REMAINS A NAVIGABLE STREAM. 
Attorney General's Opinion No. 632 of January 6, 1970, and the 
Legislative Council's Opinion of January 13, 19'10, are correct. In the 
case of State of Utah v. United states, 39 LW. 471'1, decided by the United 
states Supreme Court on June 'I, 19'11, the traditional concept of navigability 
was reaffirmed. The Court, in upholding Utah's claim to the bed of the 
Great Salt Lake, reaffirmed that the question of navigability is 1n many ways 
a federal question. '!he Court relied on the test of navigability stated In 
The tJteamer Danbl Ball v. United States, 10 Wall 55'1 (1871). That test 
is as follows: 
"Those rivers must be regarded as public 
navigable rivers in law which are naVigable in 
fact. And they are ·navlgable in fact when they 
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their ordinary conditions, as highways for 
commerce, over which trade and travel are or 
may be conducted in the customary modes of 
trade and travel on water • • • " 
The Court noted that the "equal fooUng" prlaclple grants newly 
admitted states the same property interests in submerged lands as was 
enjoyed by the thirteen original states as successors to the British Crown. 
The United States, as owner of the bed of the navigable stream, transfers 
the right of ownership to the bed at the point of statehood. The ownership t.o 
the bed is fixed in the new state. 
If the Carson River were pavigable on October 31, 1864, it remain 
navigable to thls d,ate, no matter what its current usage and no matter what. 
its current fi:ow. _Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. l (1893); United States v. 
Oregon, 295 U.S.111934). The factual question of navigability can·be said 
to be dependent upon the Jaw and usages recognized and applied in federal 
courts even when waters are not capable of use In interstate or foreign 
commerce. U.S. v. utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); U.S. v. Oregon, supra; 
Shively v •. Bowlby, supra. 
The history of the Carson River factually establishes that it was 
navigable on October 31, 1864. Chapter VI of the Second Session of the 
Nevada Territorial Legislature, enacted on December 10, 1862, gave a 
stat\atory grant of the right to float logs on the Carson River. While the 
legislative mandate would not alone determine navigabWty, it is a clear 
indication of the Carson River's historical context. In the primary early 
history of the state, History of Nevada, 'lbompson and West, republished 
1958, Howell-North, Berkeley, California, there is a discussion on page 111 
of the Carson River and its uses. The historian notes that thousands of car 
-2-
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of. wood were floated down the Carson River each year to supply fuel for the 
. 
towns of Virginia and Carson and for the quartz mills in Storey and Lyon 
Cowities. The historian notes that in 1881 the Carson had an average width 
of 60 feet and a depth of three or folll' feet. The historian further says, 
"the Carson may be called the only navigable river in the State." While 
this history was originally published In 1881, it indicates that a.t statehood 
and for a period of time thereafter the Carson was., In fact, a tool of 
commerce. It therefore remains navigable to this date. 
The recent Nevada ~se of State Engineer of the State of Nevada 
v. Cowles Brothers, 88 Nev. 8'12, 478 P. 2d 159 (19'70), the Nevada Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that the aforementioned tests and considerations were 
applicable to streams in the State of Nevada, ·particularly noting that naviga-
bility at statehood meant continued navigability. 'Ibe Court relied on Brewer 
Oil Company v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922), 1n stating that a body of 
water ls navigable If it is used or usable in its ordinary condition as a highwa: 
. 
of commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the 
customary modes of trade and travel on water. The flotation of lumber is a 
customary mode of trade. Itwas:particularly so at the period of time at which 
the State of Nevada was admitted to the Union. 'l'he true test of navigability 
at the time of Nevada's admission to the Union would therefore seem to be 
the capability of the Carson River's use for commerce, and not the extent 
and manner of its use. Black's Pomeroy on Water Rights, S 216. Navi-
gability does not depend upon actual use, but potential use. The Carson was 
facv,any navigable and is factually navigable. Its legal navtgablllty was 
fixed at the tlme of Nevada's admission to the Union. 56 AM. J'OR., Waters, 
S 181. 
-s-
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NEVADA HAS NEVER ADOPTED .AND SHOULD 
NOT ADOPT THE DISCREDITED DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN NAVIGABLE AND FLOATABLE 
STREAMS. 
In the case of Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Nev. 261 (1878), the 
Nevada Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Truckee 
River was a navigable stream, since the Truckee bad been conceded a 
lµghway for the flotation of timber. The court refused to make any distinc-
tion between navigability and floatab1ll,ty. There bu been no other Nevada 
decision. 1t therefore appears that this distinction does not exist in the 
state of Nevada. 
In the case of Nekoosa Edward Paper Company v. Railroad 
Commission, 228 N. W.144 (1929), the terms "navigable'tand "float.able' wer 
held to be synonymous. Where a stream has been used for the driving of 
. 
logs, that stream becomes a public highway. It is navigable for all purposes. 
The stream that has been navigable for pecuniary gain remains navigable for 
all purposes. The court noted that while the public right may have originated 
in the older use or capacity of water for navigation, such public right is 
retained by the people in the waters for sport and recreation. The court 
further noted that when a navigable stream ls stocked with fish for the 
benefit of the public, the state's actions on behalf of the public tndicat es 
navigability. 'lbe Carson River is ased by the public for recreational 
pUll'{lses, and an active _campaign by the Nevada Department of Fish and 
Game of protecting and propagating the fish life in th_e stream exists. The 
dlsUnctton between navigable and floa.tllbk~earnsis not viable.. To 
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Even lf the concept of floatable streams were viable and were 
effective In Nevada, the Carson River could not be considered merely a 
floatable stream. At the point of statehood, the Carson River not only 
floated logs, but was capable of use by small commercial craft. Chapter 
cxxvm of the Second Session or the Territorial Legislature, enacted on 
December 20, 1862, was entitled "~ Act to provide for the improvement 
of navigation on the Carson and Humboldt Rivers". The title of the Act 
itself presumes navlgabWty. The licensees were to improve certain parts 
of "the banks of the streams of water, in such manner as to render the 
same navigable lor the purposes of ratting, and for boats propelled by 
steam or other motive power". (Emphasis added.) 'I11e Territorial 
Legislatore specifically noted that the Carson River was already capable of 
navigatlon and that the legislaUve grant applied only to portions of the waters 
which needed improvement. This legislative grant would not alone deter-
mine navigabillty, but it ls a clear indication of the kind of uses the Carson 
River ~ould be put to immediately prior to statehood. 
CONCLUSION 
The Carson River ls navigable in law and in fact. This court can 
satisfy Itself of the navlgablllty of the Carson River by determining its use 
, 
or its capabllities of use at the point of statehood. flle law ls clear. 
Defendant State of Nevada respectfully submits that Attorney General's 
Opinion No. 632 of January 6, 1970}° is correct, and that plaintlffs-respon-
dents' complaint should have been dismissed With prejudice. 
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ESTABLISHES NAVIGABILITY RATHER THAN 
NONNA VIGABILITY. 
The test of navigabWty as used in State of Utah v. U.S., 39 L. W. 
471'1, as taken from The steamer Daniel Ball v. U.S., 10 Wall 55'1 (1871), 
and as accepted by the State of Nevada In State En eer of Nevada v. Cowles 
.!!!:2!:, 86 Nev.8'12, 478 P.2d 159 (19'10), has been met. Plaintlffs-
respondents' evidence, rather than defendant-appellantls, carried whatever 
burden was necessary to be carried in establlsh~g navigability. 
Respondents have stipulated that "as an historical fact, the 
Carson River was at one time used for the floating of logs and timber." 
.. 
Re.'3l)ondents, through their witness Grace Dangberg, then further 
established, for the benefit of appellant, that a successful flotation of Jogs 
on the carson River occurre~ in 1861 through at least 1865. Relying on the 
testimony of J.· C. Russell in the Union Mill case, respondents' witness 
Dangberg testified that a log drive was made on the river In 1861. A careful 
review of the testimony of J. C. Russell In the Union Mill case (plaintiffs' 
Exhibit C) reveals that successful flotation occurred on the river prior to 
any work's being done on the channel to facilltate the flotation of loge. Mrs. 
Dangberg testified 1n detail as to the no~tlon and the use of booms and 
ponds, which were further used to facWtate the transportation of logs. It 
should be noted that booms and ponds are normal log rafting techniqaes and 
are commercially used to further facilitate the transportation of logs on a 
stream. 
n show<:{ be noted that ~s Dangberg is a party in Interest to the 
27 subject litigation, so that her favorable answers to the issue of navigability 
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1 are all the more reason to conclude that the Carson River is in fact 
2 navigable. 
3 Appellant State of Nevada asked the Master to carefully review the 
4 testimony In the Union Mill case, since it does in fact est.abllsh successtul 
5 flotation prior to statehood. (j 
6 The numerous legislative enactments of which the Master took 
7 Judicial notice further established tm,vigabWty. They can be read as an 
8 indicia of the times. Chapter 35 of the 1861 Laws of Nevada is a franchise 
9 to use the stream as a tool of commerce. Chapter 2 of the 1862 Laws of 
10 Nevada is a grant of, inter alla, the right to convey persons or property 
11 across the river by means of ferry_ boats. Chapter 6 of the 1862 Laws of 
12 Nevada is a further extension of the grant of flota.tlon rights to J. C. Russell, 
13 et al., while Chapter 128 ~f the 1862_ Laws of Nevada, in granting licensees 
14 the right to improve the banks of tl;te river in ,nich a. manner as to render the 
15 same navigable for the purposes of rafting, speclfically noted that the Carson 
16 River was already capable of na.vtgation. aad tb;at the purposes of the grant 
17 applied only to the portions of the water which needed improvement. 
18 Chapter 3 of the 1884 Laws of Nevada. is a grant of the right to 
19 operate a ferry boat for the accommodation of the traveling public on the 
@ 20 river, as was Chapter 19 of the 1864 Laws of Nevada. 
21 
' The historical context surrounding statehood was discussed in 
I:; 22 detail by plaintiffs-respondents' witness Dangberg. Miss Dangberg ~ 
23 ! mentioned the use of pickaroon boats on the river. Witness Sanford 
24 confirmed that boats and rafts can be floated on the river. Witness 'l'bayer ii 
25 testified as to the statutory authorization to use boats on the river. In 
26 light of plaintiffs-respondents' stipulation that the logs were fioated on the 
27 rive., and In light of their evidence that there were Jog drives on the river 
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prior to statehood, and the grant of the right to run ferries on the river, it 
clearly appears that no matter what party the burden is on, plaintiffs-
respondents have established navigability beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Post-statehood indicia of continuing navigability were established 
by defendant-appellant in a num~el" of photographs showing flotation of logs 
on the river, as well as pickaroon boats and crews on the river. Addition-
ally, defendant-appellant established, through photographs introduced by 
defendant as well as by plaintiffs, that f}9at1ng dredges navigated the river. 
Plaintiffs-respondents have argued that these issues have been 
' 
or are being litigated in another forum. Defendant-appellant would point 
out that if that is so, plaintiffs-respondents should seek that other forum 
for the relief to which they feel entitled. Both the Union Mill case and the 
Alpine Reservoir case allocate water rights. They do not reach the issue 
of navlgabWty. In seeking declaratory relief, plaintiffs-respondents have 
selected a forum, stipulated as to facts in the forum, tried the case in that 
forum, and now seem to think that some other forum has determined or 
should determine their righfs. Defendant-appellant did not bring this lawsuit 
and feels no need to forum-shop. The evidence edtlced by both parties h 
this forum establishes navigability by all applicable standards. If the 
burden of proof were ever on defendant-appellant, that burden was success-
fully met by plaintiffs-respondents' stipulation as to flotation. 
Prior ~ statebo~d, there were successful log drives on the river 
and grants of authority to operate boats on the river. Subsequent to state-
hood, there were successful log drives on _the river and grants of authority 
to operate boats on the river, the operation of pickaroon boats on the river, 
and the operation of fioatlng dredges on the river. On October 31, 1864, 
the Carson River was navigable. It remains so to this day • 
-8-
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PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS' RELIANCE ON 
FEDERAL AND STATE PATENTS IS IRRELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUE OF NAVIGABILITY'. 
In an attempt to befog the effect of the evidence and the stipulation, 
plaintiffs-respondents introduced copies of the original patents and then 
proceeded to argue their effect In great detail. 
Plaintiffs-respondents rely heavily on various sections of 42 AM. 
~-, Public Lands, to make a rather circular argument tha.t reservations 
need be included in patents if the government is to retain its rights and 
property. For some reason they tend to ignore 42 AM, J'OR., Public Lands, 
S 38, which states: 
"A patent may be void, too, insofar as it attempts 
to convey public property in which the whole people 
are interested. For example, a grant of all the 
lanc;ls under the navigable waters of the state has 
never been adjudged to be within the legislative power, 
and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if 
not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation." 
It should be further noted that patents operate as a qui~laim, or rather as a 
conveyance of such interest as the United States possesses In land. They 
convey only that title that .the government has. Sampeyreac v. U. s. , 8 L. Ed. 
685; 'I Pet. 222. 
The grant of patents for the lands through which the Carson River 
Dows are grants only to the property possessed by the United States. Under 
the equal footing clause of the United states Constitution, the United States 
could .not pass title to the bed of the river. It did not own that title. 42 Am. 
Jur,, Public Lands, S 35, Nor could the State of Nevada pass title to the 
-9-
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bed of the river, for it holds it in trust for the benefit of its citizens. The 
case of Donnelly v. U.S., 228 U.S. 243, cited by plaintiffs as authority for 
the proposition that the United States government may grant lands underlying 
navipble waters prior to a sbde's admission to the Union, held no such thing. 
. . . ' 
A careful reading of the case establishes that a complicated fact situation 
existed regarding the locus of a criminal offense on an Indian reservation. 
The case of Brewer Elliott Oil poi -v. U.S., 260 U.S. 77, merely establishes 
that the United States may, for public purposes, convey certain properfies 
which may Include the beds of navigable streams. A grant to the predecessor 
in interest of the Plaintiffs-respondents is not a public purpose. 
· Defendant-appe~t would ask the Court to examine carefully the 
cases cited by plaintiffs-respondents. None of them in any way establishes 
a requirement that a reservation of the bed of streams must be included in 
either a state or a. ~ederal patent. A patent grants only what the government 
has. 'Ihe federal government cannot grant the bed to a navigable stream, and 
the state government holds that bed in trust for all lts citizens. 
m. 
THE DISTJNCTION BETWEEN NAVIGABLE 
AND FLOATABLE STREAMS BAS NOT BEEN 
ADOPTED JN NEVADA. 
In the case of Shoemaker v. Batch, 13 Nev. 261 (18'78), the Nevada 
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Truckee River was 
a navigable stream, since the Truckee b~ been conceded a highway for the 
flotation of timber and had been treated by the officers of state government 
as a navigable stream. The court stated that that action was conclusive as 
to navigability. The court was satisfied that the Truckee was navigable 
because it was a highway for the flotation of timber. The court refused to 
make any distinction between navigability and Doidahlllty, There has been 
-10-
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• • 
no other Nevada decision. It therefore appears that this distinction does not 
exist in the State of Nevada. In this regard, see also Nekoosa Edward Paper 
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 228 N. W.144 (1929). 
The floatable distinction is not a common law rule, but a devia.tion 
from the common law, based on commercial convenience. The only states 
that have adopted it are those in which the timber industry is exceptionally 
important to the commerce of the state and in which small creeks and 
streams are used for the primary flotation of logs from the source of cutting 
to the main channel of commerce. Plaintlffs-respondents are asking for a 
deviation from the common law. Grounds for deviation do not exist. The 
Nevada test, as established in Shoemaker v. Hatch, supra, and as reaffirmed 
in state Engineer v. Cowles, supra, does not make the distinctlon that 
plaintiffs seek to make. 
It is the generally accepted rule that a stream capable of being 
used for floating logs is navigable and constitutes a highway of commerce. 
52 Am. Jur .1.d, Logs and Timber, S 70. A stream may be used as a highway 
for the notation of logs even though lt ls ordinarily subject to periodic 
fluctuations in volume and height which are attributable to natural causes 
and which occur as regularly as the seasons. 'Ibe only test Is whether the 
stream has periods of high water for a sufficient length of time to make it 
useful as a liighway. Blackman v. Mauldln, 51 So. 23; · Idaho N. R. Co. v. 
Post Falls Lumber Co., 119 P.1098. 
The Carson River did 1n fact float logs prior to statehood. In 
1861 a drl~ was !Dade down tbe river. Even U this were not so, there ls 
authority that the navigability of a stream is to be determined on t1ie·~as1s 
not only of its natural condition, but also of its possible availabllity for 
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necessary that such impr,ovements be actually completed or even authorized. 
U.S. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S.S'l7. See also 56Am.Jur. 
Waters,.§_ 189. 
Plaintiffs.:respondents are asldng the court to adopt a rule which is 
contradictory to the commercial standards applied in the state. This court 
should not deviate from the already established rule of law. Plaintiffs-
respondents admit that the Carson River was used to float logs. They have 
established through their own evidence that the Carson River floated logs 
prior to statehood, When faced with the natural results of their stipulation 
and evidence, they asked the court to adopt a minority rule tha.t neither 
historically suits the Nevada condition nor relates to the established law of 
the Jurisdiction. 
IV. 
THE EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS CLAIMED 
BY PLAlNTIFFS-RESPONDENTS DO NOT APPLY 
IN THlS CASE. . 
It ts a general rule of law that divestiture of title to property by 
abandonment is not applicable to real property. The law ls clear that 
corporeal hereditaments cannot be abandoned. Personal property and 
incorporeal hereditaments are subject to abandonment. The bed of the 
Carson River is a corporeal hereditament and not subject to abandonment. 
1 Am.Jur. 2d, Abandoned Property, SS 13 and 14. An examination of 
plaintiffs-respondents' citations regarding ab.andonment establishes that each 
of them applies to Incorporeal rather than corporeal hereditaments. 
It ls clear that if the State owns the river bed, it cannot abandon 
the river bed through any kind of conduct. As owner of the real property, 
the State of Nevada has retained all rights and privileges running to any 
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Estoppel does not run to the transfer of real property. Plaintiffs have not 
pleaded the doctrine of adverse possession, and have taken none of the steps 
necessary to gain title by and through adverse possession. It should be noted 
that the bed of the river, under the rules of navigability, is held by the state 
in a. public trust for the benefit of all the citizens of the State. 
The case of State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H.132, 105 A. 519, discusses 
why there can ordinarily be no estoppel agatnst public rights. The court held 
that only the Legl.sla.ture has the authority to convey away public rights, and 
the lack of power to convey is as fatal to a transfer by estoppel as to one by 
deed. The court held that the State's rights in public waters cannot be con-
veyed or impaired by an estoppel growing out of a mere failure to object to 
encroachments. In this regard, see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and 
Waiver, S 123. The general rule is that the doctrine of estoppel will not be 
applied against a state in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity. 
1 A. L.R. 2d 344; Cases In which ~stoppel has been upheld ~t states 
are generally those In which the state is acting in a contractual capacity. 
There is also authority that a state, by virtue of its sovereign status, cannot _ 
be estopped by deed. 
The cases of Mouat v. Minneapolis Mining and Smelting Co., 
68Mont.253, 21'(P.342, andHeywardv. Farmers'MlningCo., 42S.C.138, 
19 S. E. 963, both held that even if a grant exists covering land not subject to 
entry, the state is not estopped from setting up title to such land. '!he 
Heyward case held that a grant by the state of land in the usual way, through 
its land office, which covered land under navigable waters, did not estop the 
state from setting up title to such land. 
None of the cases cited by plaintiffs-respondents claimlng that 
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Ea.ch·or them involves the a9ceptance of financial remuneraUon .. or·benefit by 
a political subdivision which arises out of a change of position caused by a 
public contract, lease, emergency Joan, or procedural step in litigation. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents again ask the court to adopt a minority 
rllle In conntct with the law as it now exists 1n the State of Nevada. Real 
property cannot be. abandoned, and the State cannot be estopped while acting 
1n its governmental, public or sovereign capacity. 
CONCLUSION 
It does not matter which party has the burden of proof. Plaintiffs• 
Respondents have established navigability. Their brief ls filled with 
extraneous arguments in an attempt to avoid the clear effect of the facts and 
the law as applied to those facts. Defendant-appellant State of Nevada. would 
ask the court to disregard superfluous arguments. By all appropriate tests, 
the Carson River was and ls a navigable stream, 





~ .0 JJ,J.: .~--.w.-.&... 
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